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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the major obstacles to development 
and deployment of effective u.S. Theater Missile Defense 
(TMD) systems. America is embarked on an aggressive TMD 
acquisition program with 12 TMD systems under research and 
development, including the Brilliant Eyes satellite and the 
Israeli Arrow program. 
This thesis reviews the effects of ambiguities in the 
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty on TMD development. 
Current TMD programs are further evaluated to determine if 
they have the capability to counter strategic ballistic 
missiles. Other issues examined include the effects of 
technology advancement on the ABM treaty and TMD, funding 
restraints of TMD, and the implications for the global arms 
control structure of an abrogated ABM Treaty. 
This study concludes that several of America's TMD 
programs under consideration are capable against strategic 
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BXBCUTIVB SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the major obstacles to development 
and deployment of effective U.S. Theater Missile Defense 
(TMD) systems. America is embarked on an aggressive TMD 
acquisition program with at least 12 TMD systems under 
research and development, including the Brilliant Eyes 
satellite and the Israeli Arrow program. 
The obstacles to this new direction in ballistic missile 
defense are many and give rise to a host of questions, such 
as: one, how ambiguous is the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty in relation to TMD development and deployment? 
Two, do current u.s. TMD programs possess capabilities to 
counter strategic ballistic missiles? Three, what are the 
implications for the global arms control structure for an 
abrogated or weakened ABM Treaty? Four, are technological 
advances in TMD sensors, missile interceptors, radar, and 
external cueing available to TMD systems out-pacing the ABM 
Treaty? And finally, can the Department of Defense's 
declining budget profile support an expanding TMD program? 
This thesis addresses these questions in four chapters. 
Chapter II reviews the ABM Treaty for current and past 
ambiguities that will impact u.s. plans for TMD development 
and deployment. This chapter also reviews the impact of 
treaty ambiguity on TMD development and the distinction 
vi 
between TMD and ABM defensive systems. Chapter III examines 
current u.S. TMD systems and models their capability to 
counter strategic ballistic missiles in an environment 
subject to nuclear weapon blast effects. Chapter IV surveys 
the implications of a weakened or abrogated ABM Treaty on the 
arms control structure. Chapter V reviews prospects for the 
future and funding restraints to TMO development. 
This thesis finds that the ABM Treaty was ambiguous when 
it was signed in 1972, and it is still ambiguous today. Past 
ambiguities applied mostly to ABM systems, but advances in 
missile defense technology blurred the distinction between 
TMD and ABM defense systems. The absence of a demarcation 
line in the treaty between TMD and ABM defense does not 
provide the proper restraint on TMD systems. This study 
concludes that wide-area defenses, such as the Army's Theater 
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Navy Upper-Tier are 
capable against strategic ballistic missiles and thereby 
violate the ABM Treaty. An ignored or ineffective ABM Treaty 
may lead to a weakening of the arms control structure and a 
halt in offensive arms reductions between the two nuclear 
Superpowers. 
Finally, funding restraints comprise part of the policy 
dilemma facing the Adminstration, Congress and DOD: how to 
develop effective TMD in an environment of declining defense 
budgets and an ambiguous ABM Treaty? Although the United 
States has expended considerable funds on THAAD system 
vii 
development, the THAAD interceptor's viability depends on the 
success of a recent Clinton adminstration proposal to clarify 
the ABM Treaty with the Russians. The ABM Treaty needs to be 
changed to prevent wasteful expenditure of TMD funds on 
systems that can not be fully tested or deployed, and to 
prevent unrestrained TMD development. 
viii 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After the Gulf War and its relentless Scud missile 
attacks, the United States reoriented the ballistic missile 
defense program to prioritize Theater Missile Defense (TMD) . 
National missile defense of the "Star Wars" era, was reduced 
in funding and relegated to research only. The United states 
is embarked on an aggressive TMD acquisition program with 12 
systems under research and development, including the 
Brilliant Eyes satellite and Israeli Arrow program. 
America's concerted approach to effective TMD development 
and deployment faces at least three major obstacles: first, 
highly capable TMD development may lead to a violation of the 
ABM Treaty and needless expenditure of funds for systems that 
can not be deployed; second, the ABM Treaty's functional 
definition of an ABM system is outdated by advancements in 
technology; and, third, declining budget realities may limit 
produ~tion to two or three TMD programs. 
This thesis examines U.S Theater defense Programs under 
consideration and evaluates major obstacles to their 
development and deployment. America's development and 
deployment of highly capable TMD systems may lead to a 
capability to intercept strategic, as well as theater 
ballistic missiles. This has serious implications for U.S. 
policy makers, the arms control structure, and our strategic 
1 
deterrence postur~. The continued development of TMD systems 
that are capat~e of intercepting strategic ballistic missiles 
may lead to abrogation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty. l 
A. BACKGROUND 
TMD was addressed only as a sideline issue during the 
"Star WarsN era, because the systems were perceived as "not" 
capable against strategic ballistic missiles. TMD system 
development recently gained attention, because of concern 
that the U.S. would deploy highly capable TMD systems that 
are also capable of countering strategic ballistic missiles. 
Although the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 
system is scheduled to begin flight tests this fall, there is 
still a question of whether it is compliant with the ABM 
Treaty. 
TMD development by the United States raises many other 
questions, most of which remain unanswered. Key among them 
to be addressed in this thesis are: first, how ambiguous is 
the ABM Treaty in relation to TMD systems? Second, do 
current U.S. TMD programs possess capabilities to counter 
strategic ballistic missiles? Third, will the lack of a 
demarcation line between TMD and ABM systems in the treaty 
prohibit TMD systems from acquiring a capability against a 
!Hereafter referred to as •ABM Treaty.• 
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strategic ballistic missile? Fourth, what are the 
implications for the global arms control structure for :tn 
abrogated ABM Treaty? Fifth, are technological advances -·· 
TMD sensors, missile interceptors, radar, and external cueing 
available to TMD systems out-pacing the ABM Treaty? 
B. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is grounded on the premise that the 
development of theater ballistic missile defenses is 
inextricably linked to strategic ballist~r missile defenses. 
because of ambiguities in the ABM treaty. The ABM treaty 
will be reviewed as it applies to the distinction in the 
treaty between strategic ballistic missile defense and 
theater ballistic missile defense. This review will examine 
other ambiguities in the treaty that were previously thought 
applicable only to strategic missile defense. From a policy 
making perspective this analysis will demonstrate the 
barriers that proponents of TMD should have to overcome, 
since the majority of the arguments that apply to theater 
defenses are also applicable to strategic defenses. 
Upon completion of the ABM treaty review, current TMD 
systems will be examined to determine whether they comply 
with the ABM treaty as it is ir,terpreted by the present 
Presidential Administration, the arms control community, 
Congress, and others. General performance characteristics of 
each theater defense system will be ctiscussed followed by the 
3 
use of a capability model to ascertain TMD capability to 
intercept a strategic ballistic missile. The model uses 
footprint analysis in combination with nuclear weapon blast 
effects to simulate the possible interaction between a TMD 
interceptor and a Strategic ballistic missile. 
The next section of the thesis will include a discussion 
of tha current global arms control structure as it relates to 
the ABM treaty. The ABM treaty will be assessed as the 
foundation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT} and 
the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). This section 
will evaluate the possible effects on offensive arms control 
agreements caused by an abrogation of the ABM treaty. 
The thesis concludes with an review of futu~e prospects 
available to the United States in the arena of TMD 
development and deployment. Differences in the number of 
planned TMD systems are evaluated against budget dollars 
available in a declining defense posture. Is it in the u.s. 
interest to seek agreed-upon definition of TMD to prevent 
further erosion of the ABM treaty? Well thought- out policy 
options may prevent the needless expenditure of funds for TMD 
systems that cannot be deployed or fully utilized because of 
ABM treaty conflicts. 
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I I. THE ABM TREATY 
The ABM treaty was negotiated between the United States 
and the Soviet Union during 1971 and 1972; it was signed by 
President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev on May 
26, 1972. The ABM treaty was considered soon thereafter by 
the United States Senate, which gave its advice and consent 
on August 3, 1972, with no reservations or conditions. The 
ABM treaty entered into force on October 3, 1972 and has been 
in effect continuously since that time.2 
The Protocol to the ABM treaty was signed in Moscow on 
July 3, 1974 and entered into force on May 24, 1976. 3 The ABM 
treaty, together with the Protocol of 1974, further limits 
the United States and the Soviet Union each to one ABM 
deployment area, so restricted and so located that it cannot 
provide a nationwide ABM defense or become the basis for 
developing one.4 In short, the ABM treaty provides 
2Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Systems, May 26, 1972, UST 3435, TIAS no. 7503. 
3 See the Protocol to the Treaty Between The United States of 
America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics On the Limitation of 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3, 1974, 27 UST 1645, TIAS no. 
8276. Reprinted in Appendix B. 
4ABM Treaty. Article III originally provided for two ABM deployment 
areas for each party to the treaty, one around the Party's national 
capital and one area containing ICBM silo launchers. The Protocol limit 
is one area for each party. 
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restrictions on numbers of ABM deployment areas and site 
locations, thereby, preventing the development of a 
nationwide ABM defense. Each nations retaliatory missile 
force remain unchallenged by strong active defenses. Article 
I of the ABM treaty reinforces this point: 
Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a 
defense of the territory of its country and not to 
provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM 
systems for defense of an individual region except as 
provided for in Article III of this Treaty. 5 
Each nation pledged not develop ballistic missile defenses, 
other than the one area allowed by the treaty, and to remain 
defenseless against a massive ballistic missile attack. 
Moreover, at the one ABM site permitted, no more than 100 
interceptor missiles and 100 launchers were allowed. In 
addition to these quantitative restrictions, technological 
improvements are likewise limited; for example, both parties 
are prohibited from developing, testing, or deploying ABM 
launchers capable of launching more than one interceptor 
missile at a time.6 
A. BACKGROUND 01' ABK 'l'RBA'l'Y AKBIGOI'l'IBS 
The ABM treaty is unclear and not well defined in 
relation to TMD development and deployment. Amazingly brief 
by today•s standards, the ABM treaty consists of a Preamble 
and 16 Articles. The ABM treaty also includes three 
Srbid., Article I. 
6rbid., Article v. 
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attachments that delineate Agreed Statements, Common 
Understandings, and Unilateral Statements derived during the 
period of treaty negotiations.- According to John 
Rhinelander: "These 'Agreed Statements' and 'Common 
Understandings' are an ilitegral part of the Treaty and help 
to clarify some elements of its text." 8 The current writer 
maintains that the very existence of the three attachments 
that originated during treaty negotiations and enclosed to 
further clarify the treaty, but, were not included as a part 
of the treaty proper, is ambiguous and provides a recipe for 
trouble. 
One conclusion that can be drawn from a casual review of 
the attachments to the ABM Treaty is that the majority of the 
Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, Unilateral 
Statements, and sec Agreements apply to the first six 
articles of the ABM treaty. Logical analysis would assume 
that the first six articles of the ABM treaty to be 
unambiguous since the majority of the clarifications are 
written against those articles.9 
7 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agreements; Texts and Histories of Negotiations, 1982 ed., 
Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 137-63. 
8Ja,hn B. Rhinelander, •The ABM Treaty Evolution and 
Interpretation, • quoted in Hans Gunter Brauch, ed., Star W4rs and 
European pefense, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1987, p. 384. 
9of course, the argument could be made that this is an expected 
occurrence since the greater part of the controlling articles (those 
articles that actually perform the functional aspects of the treaty as 
opposed to verification or administration) are, by design articulated in 
7 
Although the brevity of the AB~ Treaty text should not be 
an indil;ator of ambiguity, the text length of the three 
attachments to the treaty exceeds the treaty text. Perhaps, 
the brevity of the articles comprising the ABM treaty is one 
of its greatest weaknesses. As table I indicates, treaty 
length has increased over the years. Comparison of the ABM 
TABLE I: PAGE COUNT OF VARIOUS TREATIES 
TREATY NUMBER OF PAGES YEAR SIGNED 
ABM 6 1972 
SALT I 4 1972 
SALT II 32 1979 
HALIBUT FISHERY 36 1979 
PACIFIC SALMON 31 1985 
INF 90 1987 
START I 250 1991 
Note: Pages counts are approximate and intended to show relative 
differences only. ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile); Salt (Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks); INF (Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear 
Forces (INF); START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks). 
Treaty's length to the START I Treaty illustrates more than 
an order-of-magnitude difference at 250 pages of text. A 
review of more recent arms control treaties, such as the 
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and 
the START treaties, reveals that a major ABM treaty ambiguity 
is corrected by the simple addition of a glossary of terms. 
the first six articles. Acceptance of this argument, however, supports 
the basic premise that the ABM treaty is still ambiguous at best. 
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The ABM treaty has not been changed or updated in 12 years 
and it remains ambiguous in relation to TMD development. The 
absence of detail and what the treaty does not say is 
probably its most egregious fault. 
B. CURRENT TREATY AMBIGUITIES 
This section will demonstrate that the evaluation of TMD 
compliance with the ABM treaty is unclear in many areas of 
the treaty previous thought to apply only to ABM defense. 
Advancements in missile defense technology have greatly 
improved TMD capability to the point where the distinction 
between theater and ABM defenses is less clear. This section 
will also show that the treaty is still ambiguous in the same 
areas supposedly clarified by attachments to the treaty, in 
1972. 
The post Cold War environment is producing pressure to 
revise the ABM treaty and thereby relieve some of the 
ambiguities related to the lack of distinction between TMD 
and ABM defenses in the treaty. The memory of the Gulf War 
and the relentless Scud missile attacks intensified the need 
for a more efficacious missile defense system. Although 
America and her allies were thankful for the improved 
protection and morale engendered by the Patriot Missile 
Defense batteries, the final result of the Patriot may have 
9 
been more political than military.l 0 The resulting drive by 
the United States and other developed nations, to develop and 
deploy TMDs that are appropriate for the projected ballistic 
missile threat, is the engine that drives the ABM debate. 
Several authors have examined TMD in the proper 
perspective as it relates to the ABM treaty; that is, the 
current and past ambiguities in the ABM treaty are just as 
critical to TMD and the so-called II SAM Upgrade II problem, as 
they are, to ABM defenses. 11 Theater defenses and strategic 
defenses do not exist in separate vacuums and should be 
addressed in an interrelated context due to improved 
performance, both, in ballistic missiles and in ballistic 
missile defenses. The following sections will address the 
major ambiguities of the ABM Treaty as they relate to TMD. 
1. Not to Provide a Base Por Defense of Territory 
The Preamble succinctly lays the groundwork for the 
fundamental objective of the ABM treaty which is to limit the 
development and deployment of ABM systems: 
10Most critics acknowledge that the deployment of the Patriot kept 
the Israelis from entering the war and destroying the allied coalition, 
but the military effectiveness of the Patriot was questioned. See John 
Conyers Jr., •The Patriot Myth: Caveat Emptor, • Arms Control Today, 
November 1992, P. 3; and, Andrew W. Hull •Motivations for Producing 
Ballistic Missiles and Satellite Launch Vehicles,• Jane's Intelligence 
Rgyigw, February 1993, p. 86. 
llsee Brian D. Dailey and Patrick J. Parker, eds., Soyiet Strategic 
peception, Hoover Institution Press, Lexington, Mass., 1987, p. 226-251; 
and, Herbert Lin, New weapon Tecbnglogias & the ABM Treaty, Pergamon-
Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Mclean, VA., 1988, p. xiii-
xviii. 
10 
Considering that effective measures to limit anti-
ballistic missile systems would be substantial factor in 
curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would 
lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war 
involving nuclear weapons .... :::. 
Article I (2) of the ABM treaty codifies the agreement by the 
United States and the Soviet Union to not to deploy strategic 
defenses: 
Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a 
defense of the territory of its country and not to 
provide a base for sucb a defense [emphasis added], 
and not to deploy ABM Systems for defense of an individual 
region except as provided for in Article III of this 
Treaty. 
In short, each Party to the ABM treaty ostensibly 
subscribed to the hostage view of nuclear war known as the 
doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) 13 and promised to 
remain defenseless against nuclear attack via ballistic 
missiles. So, the possibility of one party to the ABM treaty 
contemplating a so-called breakout of the treaty, was a 
consistent debate throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The words 
above, from Article I of the ABM treaty, are just one of the 
many ambiguous phrases that have never been defined or agreed 
to, by the United States and the Soviet Union. What do the 
12The ABM Treaty (Preamble). 
13For an opposing viewpoint, see Dailey and Parker, eds., Soviet 
Strategic peception, p. 226-7. Brian Dailey skillfully argues in 
Chapter 11 that the Soviets used deception to convince the United States 
that they (the Soviets) accepted MAD: •rn short, the bases on which the 
Soviets entered the negotiations were to, first, mask their objective of 
stopping or significantly curtailing the U.S. ABM research to buy time 
for the Soviet active defense program, and second, after 1972, to adjust 
the deception to reinforce Western perceptions and predilections of 
Soviet military strategy as a solely assured-destruction policy. 
11 
words "provide a base for a nationwide defense of territory" 
actually mean in terms of ABM defenses, and, more importantly 
what do they mean in regard to TMD? 
Agreed Statement (C) to the ABM treaty attempted to 
strengthen the intent of Article (I) to "not provide a base," 
by mandating: " ... the center of the ABM system deployment area 
centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM 
system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each 
Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred 
kilometers." The New World Dictionary defines "base" as: 
"the thing or part on which something rests"; "lowest part or 
bottom"; "foundation. "14 The apparent difficulty with 
defining the term "base" lies in selecting or identifying that 
thing or part which forms the foundation for a nationwide 
defense of territory. 
Many parts or components of TMD could be perceived as 
providing a base for a nationwide defense of territory 
described in Article I of the treaty. Major items that are 
used for TMD, but could ostensibly be used to provide a base 
for expansion of TMD to a nationwide ABM defense include: (1) 
Large Phased-Array Radar (LPAR) ; ( 2) Aegis Cruisers with 
missiles capable of exoatmospheric intercept; (3) Sam Upgrade 
Problem; ( 4) Brilliant Eyes satellite; ( 5) Boost Phase 
Intercept; (6) Airborne and Interceptor Sensors. 
14wabster's Haw World pictionary, 2nd College ed., s.v. •Base.• 
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a. Large Phased-Array Radars and TMD 
Large ABM radars are considered the verifiable 
element of the "base" for a ballistic missile defense of 
territory. LPARs are examined in relation to TMD because of 
the possibility that unrestrained development and deployment 
of theater defense radar may be perceived as a violation of 
the ABM treaty. Gerard Smith suggested that "the warning 
time given by a Soviet start of construction of radars of the 
LPAR type would be long enough to permit extensive 
countermeasures such as the development and initial 
deployment of wholly new offensive missile systems." 15 
Consequently, the LPARs were considered the critical guiding 
eyes of ABM systems, and the "long-lead-time item" of a 
nationwide defense .16 
The ambiguity in LPARs construction and operation 
occurs because the ABM treaty allows radars for early warning 
(Article VI) 17 ,space tracking, National Technical Means (NTM) 
and LPARs. These radars are all very similar in appearance 
and function. Significant confusion results in distinguishing 
the very similar LPARs from a Ballistic Missile Early Warning 
lScerard Smith, pouble T4lk, p. 303. 
16Ma t thew Bunn, Foundation for the Future ; The ABM Treaty and 
N4tional Security, The Arms Control Association, Wash, D.C., 1990, p. 
108. 
17The ABM Treaty, Article VI. The article stipulates •not to deploy 
in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile 
attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory 
and oriented outward. 
13 
( BMEW) radar and the LPARs used for space tracking and 
verification by NTM. 18 The United States and the Soviet Union 
made serious charges and counter charges about the 
Krasnoyarsk radarl 9 (challenged as an ABM facility) and the 
Thule/Fylingdales upgrade (challenged as an ABM facility). 
The Soviets initially claimed Krasnoyarsk was a space 
tracking radar, but later agreed that Krasnoyarsk was a 
violation of the ABM treaty.20 
The differences in function between LPARs and TMD 
radars are many (e.g., size, frequency, hardness, range, 
etc.), but the effect of unlimited TMD radar deployment may 
be the same--a perceived notion of a breakout from the ABM 
treaty. Critics of the Soviet Mobile ABM-X-3 and SA-12 have 
pointed out that these systems could be effective against 
U.S. strategic warheads, particularly SLBM warheads, if they 
were netted with ABM radars. 21 The THAAD TMD Ground-Based-
18The ABM Treaty, Agreed Statement (F). This agreement also limits 
deployed phased-array raiders to a potential (the product of mean 
emitted power in watts and antenna in square meters) of three million 
watts/meter squared except where permitted elsewhere in the treaty and 
NTM or space tracking. 
19seport to Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiatiye, 
Washington, D.C., Department of Defense, 1989, 1-5. 
20Matthew Bunn, Fgundation for the future, p. 101. 
21The ABM or other long range radar could hand over tracking 
information, •tipping off• the short range TMD radar that a target was 
on the way and where to look for it. See Simon P. Worden, SDI and the 
Alternatiyes, National Defense University Press, Washington, D.C., 1991, 
p. 152; Department of Defense, Soyiet Military Power, Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1982, p. 28; and, Jack Anderson, 
•soviet Missile May Be Peril to US Weapon,• Washington Pos~, April 5 
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Radar (TMD-GBRl is designed to be externally cued by 
satellites such as Brilliant Eyes.:: The argument could be 
made that external cueing of the TMD-GBR is analogous to the 
u.s. complaint of Soviet netting of the SA-12 TMD system to 
ABM radars. There is no evidence that the Russians have made 
this argument, but the logic is clear. Developing policy 
options after hardware is already built, is normally an 
unwise expenditure of funds. 
Range capability of TMD radar is primarily 
dependent on output power. Agreed Statement (F) of the ABM 
treaty specifically limits output potential (usually 
expressed in "power aperture product) of ABM radars to three 
million watt-meters squared, 23 but the potential of theater 
defensive radar is not regulated. Obviously, the mobility of 
theater systems is constrained by the size and power of the 
antenna, but without power aperture product restrictions 
significant range capability is still possible. For 
example, during the Gulf War, Aegis ships--the cruiser 
"Mobile Bay• and others--tracked scuds from hundreds of miles 
1983, p. ClS. For an opposing viewpoint see Hans Gunter Brauch, ed., 
Star wars and European Defence, p. 510. 
22rnterview between William Loomis, Vice-President, Defensive 
Missile Systems, Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Sunnyvale, CA., and the 
author, 29 April 1994; see also Barbara Opall, •strategic Accord 
Inhibits Advances In TMD Programs,• Defense News, 4 October 1994, p. 1. 
23•power aperture product• is the product of mean emitted power in 
watts and antenna area in square meters. 
15 
away with the precision required to support intercepts.=~ The 
Theater High Altitude Area Defense {THAAD) system, currently 
in development by the US Army, reportedly has a nominal 
detection range of about 500 kilometers. 25 On the other hand, 
the Patriot system radar is not nearly as capable with only a 
few tens of kilometers range against a low radar cross-
section target. The differences in range between the Patriot 
and THAAD systems depend on many other factors besides power 
aperture product, but all other factors being equal, the 
power aperture product of the Patriot radar is estimated at 
100,000 watt-meters squared--significantly less than THAAD. 26 
The development of the THAAD system is prima 
facie evidence of how improvements, in power aperture 
product of TMD radar along ·.~ith concomitant interceptor 
enhancements, can dramatically increase range and 
capability.27 The power aperture product of the THAAD system 
24John E. Carey, •Fielding a Theater Ballistic Missile Defense,• 
Proceedings, June 1993, p. 56. 
25For an excellent examination of the range determinate factors of 
theater defenses, including type and nature of the assumed target, see 
Lisbeth Gronlund and others, •Highly Capable Theater Missile Defenses 
And the ABM Treaty,• ArmS Control T9day, April 1994, p. 3-8. 
26Herbert Lin, New Weapon Tecbnologies, p. 48. 
27The published intercept range for THAAD is approximately 160 km, 
which suggest a conservative detection range of at least 300 km for the 
projected theater threat. See Clifford Beal, •Racing to Meet the 
Ballistic Missile Threat,• Internatignal pafanse Rayiew, March 1993, p. 
209. 
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radar is estimated at roughly 500,000 watt-meters squared.:~ 
With an estimated expansion of five to six times the current 
TMD radar power before treaty limits are reached, concurrent 
improvements in interceptors could, at least, double the 
nominal range to 1000 km--all other factors equal. This type 
of development, could lead to the greatest threat to the 
viability of the ABM treaty. 
b. Navy Upper-Tier 
Theater defenses use phased-array radars that are 
mobile land-based or sea-based, and rapidly deployable--all 
features are specifically prohibited by the ABM treaty. 
Article V of the ABM treaty is clear: 
Each Party undertakPs not to develop, test, or deploy ABM 
systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, 
space-based, or mobile land-based.29 
Any future TMDs will possess all of these features but none 
of these capabilities are limited or even mentioned by the ABM 
treaty in regard to TMD. Therein lies the TMD-ABM 
interoperability problem and possible use in a "base" for a 
nationwide defense. The numbers and specific deployment 
locations of TMD systems are not regulated at all. 
As TMD systems improve in range and capability to 
intercept strategic missiles, their perceived use to fill gaps 
28The actual figure is classified, but industry officials report 
the number to be less than one million watts-meter squared--at most less 
than one third of the ABM treaty limits. Interview between William 
Loomis, vice president for defensive missile systems at Lockheed 
Missiles & Space Co., Sunnyvale, CA., and the author, 29 April 1994. 
29ABM Treaty Article v. 
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in existing ballistic missile early warning coverage or to 
provide a strategic defense may be contemplated. Two recent 
examples of perceived strategic use of the Navy upper-tier 
theater defense system illustrate this point perfectly: ( 1) 
Admiral Kelso (The former Chief of Naval Operations) was 
quoted in the New York Times of August, 1993 as saying: "we 
could take a fleet of Aegis cruisers off the East coast of the 
United States and provide missile defense of the United 
States"; ( 2) not surprisingly, the essence of that statement 
was repeated by Admiral William D. Smith on November 3, 1993: 
We could take a small number of Aegis cruisers stationed 
off the East Coast of the United States and provide 
missile defense of the United States. 30 
Clearly, the Aegis cruisers are viewed by proponents as a 
means to provide a "base" for expansion to a nationwide ABM 
system. 
If the u.s. does not control the number of 
systems and how we deploy them, the viability of the ABM 
treaty will be threatened.3 1 Recent TMD talks between France 
and the United States reportedly used simulations in which 
just two Aegis cruisers in the Western Mediterranean, armed 
30william D. Smith, •Forum on Theater Ballistic Missile Defense,• 
hosted at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., 3 November 1993. 
31This assumes that the Aegis cruisers will have capability to 
intercept not just theater ballistic missiles, but strategic ballistic 
missiles as well. This is probably a valid assurrption if the Aegis 
cruisers are given exoatmospheric intercept capability. 
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with Standard Block IV-A missiles with LEAP32 seekers and 
working with a Cobra Judy phased-array radar on Corsica, 
demonstrated their ability to protect from missile attack an 
area extending from Rome to London. 31 Without question a sea-
based exoatmospheric TMD system, with capabili~y to intercept 
a strategic ballistic missile, will violate the ABM treaty by 
providing a "base" for nationwide defense of u.s. territory. 
John Pike also sees the exoatmospheric Aegis cruiser as a 
major problem for the ABM treaty: 
If the Navy's system is permitted under the treaty, all 
the United States would have to do to very rapidly get a 
nationwide system, would be to have the all the 
Ticonderoga Aegis cruisers come back to home port and 
ring the country with these interceptors. From the 
standpoint of being able to very rapidly break out of the 
treaty, in the long run the SM-2 LEAP is probably going 
to be of far greater concern than THAAD.34 
The funding of the upper-tier defense for the Aegis cruiser 
has been reduced by the Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization (BMDO) for its FY95 budget request 
32The Standard Missile Block IV-A with LEAP (Lightweight Exo-
Atmospheric Projectile) is planned as the Navy's so-called upper-tier 
theater defense system. The intercept range is projected to be slightly 
better than THAAD. See Barbara Starr and John Boatman, •us Navy gets 
into Theater Missile Defense,• International Qefense Review, June 1993, 
p. 468. 
33Nick Cook, •France, USA Lead the Way With TMD Talks,• Jane's 
pefence weekly, 19 March 94, p. 1. 
34John Pike, •A New Threat to the ABM Treaty: The Administration's 
TMD proposal,• Arms Control Today, January/February 1994, P. 16. 
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c • SAM Upgrade Problem 
Surface-To-Air (SAM) Upgrade is a controversial 
issue that encompasses the essence of the ABM treaty • s 
prohibition against providing a base for a defense of 
territory. The "SAM upgrade" problem started in the mid 
1960s when the Soviet Union installed a high-performance air-
defense system based on the SA-5 missile. The system was 
called the "Tallinn" system--after the name of the Estonian 
city where the SAM components were first observed. 
With the advent of the Soviet Galosh ABM missile, 
Americans began to fear that the Tallinn system might be 
designed for defense against missiles or, at the least, to 
serve a dual purpose. 35 The SA-Ss were believed to be part of 
an ABM network because the location of the system coincided 
with the potential flight paths of incoming American 
missiles. The so-called "Tallinn" line formed a defensive 
barrier that was part of the soviet's extensive air-defense 
network. With the eventual installation of some 9,000 SAM 
launchers, 2,000 interceptor aircraft, and 10,000 air-defense 
radars, the fear that the these air-defense components could 
be upgraded to a nationwide ABM system became part of the ABM 
Treaty negotiations.36 
35John Newhouse, Cold Dawn; Tbe Story gf SALT, Holt Rinehart and 
Winston, New York, 1973, p. 11. 
36Matthew Bunn, Tbe ABM Treaty, p. 49. See also Gerard Smith, 
Dguble Talk, p. 95. 
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The name "SAM Upgrade" has persisted, even today, 
as shorthand for those air-defense and TMD systems that are 
exempt from the ABM Treaty. Article VI (al of the ABM Treaty 
codifies the prohibition on upgrading non ABM systems or 
components: 
Each Party undertakes not to give missiles, launchers, or 
radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM 
launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter 
strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight 
trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode. 
The "SAM Upgrade" issue received considerable attention 
during the SALT I negotiations and throughout the 1970s and 
80s. Today the main focus of the issue is on upgrading the 
capability of TMDs to intercept strategic ballistic missiles. 
The United States recently made a proposal via the sec to 
define a demarcation line between strategic ABMs and TMDs; 
the Russians were reportedly cool to the proposal due to its 
lack of comprehensiveness and undefined technical criteria. 17 
By all accounts this debate will continue throughout the 
1990's. 
d. Brilliant Byes 
Do space-based sensors such as the Brilliant Eyes 
(BE) and the Defense Support Satellites (DSP) violate the ABM 
Treaty because vital cueing1B information can be passed on to 
37see Dunbar Lockwood, •u.s. Proposal to Retool ABM Treaty Reopens 
Debate on Missile Defense,• Arm• Cgntrol Tpday, January/February 1994, 
p. 24; and, Theresa Hitchens and Barbara Opall, •THAAD May Be Treaty 
Debate Fulcrum,• Defense Ngws, April 11 1994, p. 1. 
38cueing is one sensor telling another where to look. It greatly 
reduces reaction time by allowing the receiving system to concentrate 
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ground-based theater systems? Do these systems so greatly 
extend the range of TMDs that it gives them ABM capability? 
The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) affirmed 
that cueing supplied by BEs satellites to THAAD and Navy 
interceptors could increase the defended footprint area by a 
factor of 10 from that provided by local radar support 
alone. 39 Valid questions about development, deployment, and 
the ABM Treaty, still remain to be answered even after some 
TMD systems are already entering the demonstration and 
evaluation phase.40 It appears that the United States 
continues to build TMD capability beyond needs, but yet 
restrict its use. For example, the THAAD system has an 
interface to external cueing and specifically for the BE 
satellite. 41 Yet, the Department of Defense reportedly found 
the THAAD system compliant with the ABM Treaty provided the 
system does not use the planned Brilliant Eyes satellite. 42 
more power in a significantly reduced search area; this effectively 
increases the range of the 3ystem. 
39Report to Congress on the Strategic pefense Initiatiye, Strategic 
Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), Washington, D.C., 1993, p. A-18. 
40Interview between William Loomis, Vice-President for Defensive 
Missile Systems, Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Sunnyvale, CA., and the 
author, 29 April, 1994. Mr. Loomis confirmed that THAAD completed final 
design review in November. The Demonstration/Validation phase begins in 
the fall of 1994 with a series of 20 test launches. 
41Ibid. 
42Barbala Opall, •strategic Accord Inhibits Advances In TMD 
Programs,• pefense Ngws, 4 October 1993, p. 1. 
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Clearly, the Patriot missile batteries needed 
external cueing by the DSP satellites to provide adequate 
alerting and precise impact prediction during the Gulf War. 
Some critics claim that the external cueing provided by the 
DSP satellites was inadequate, because the system was not 
designed for short range missiles. Consequently, new 
satellite =overage is needed for future theater systems.~3 It 
appears, from the THAAD and Brilliant Eyes situation, that, 
if TMD satellite cueing is to be compliant with the ABM 
Treaty, then compliance may depend on the range of the TMD 
system. A tenfold increase in footprint coverageH for a 
lower-tier system such as Patriot would be significant, yet 
possibly non-threatening; but, the same increase in an upper 
tier system such as THAAD would reasonably stretch the 
boundary between ABM and TMD capability. 
e. Boost Phase Intercept 
The ultimate goal of any defense against 
ballistic missiles would be destruction of the enemy missile 
before it leaves the launcher. Short of that, the next best 
43Theresa Foley, •osP Advocates, Foes Cite Dhahran Scud Attack,• 
Space News, 18 April 1994, p. 4. DSP's ability to provide details on 
tactical missiles is a subject of debate. The tactical missiles burn 
more quickly and less brightly than the strategic missiles DSP was 
designed to detect. 
44This projection uses the conservative estimate by Hertbert Lin 
that assumes a single stage interceptor, such as Patriot can enforce a 
keepout zone of approximately 10 km radius. See Herbert Lin, New weapon 
Tecbnologies, p. 74-78. The current writer assumes an approximate THAAD 
footprint of 60-112 km, based on an advertised intercept range of 160 
km and reentry angle of 22-45 degrees. 
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thing is Boost Phase Intercept {BPI l . The missile is 
destroyed shortly after takeoff before it dispenses its 
deadly warheads {in the case of MIRV4 5 ) and while its still in 
the highly ~rulnerable boost phase. Additionally, the missile 
emits a large Infra-red ( IRl and light signature that is 
easily detectable by satellite or airborne platforms. 
The problem with BPI systems is that if they have 
the capability of intercepting a theater ballistic in the 
boost phase, then they also can intercept a strategic 
ballistic missile in the boost phase. BPI sys terns are 
probably the sine qao non for providing a base for 
territorial defense. The BMDO's 1995-1999 budget request 
increased the funding profile, assigned to BPI, from less 
than $100 million to $500 million through 1999--for a system 
that clearly violates the ABM Treaty. 46 
f. Airborne and Interceptor Sensors 
Can a Satellite or airborne mounted IR sensor 
serve the same function as a phased-array radar for a theater 
or strategic defensive missile system? Some 200 Brilliant 
Eyes satellites were envisioned for the Bush Administration's 
Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system to 
45(MIRV)Multiple Independently-Targeted Reentry Vehicles. 
46Robert Holzer and Barbara Opall, •u.s. Navy Fights BMDO for 
Antimissile Funds,• Defense News, 11 April 1994, p. 8. The Navy's sea-
based upper-tier (Aegis SM-2 LEAP) system was reduced in funding from $600 to $157 Million and downgraded to a demonstration effort over the 
same period. 
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provide early warning and targeting information needed for 
missile defense.~7 With today's technology, satellites (e.g. 
DSP or Brilliant Eyes) or aircraft mounted IRST (Infrared 
Search and Track) sensors can easily form part of a missile 
defense network and theater defense system if so designed. 
Even some ABM proponents reluctantly acknowledge, 
that a reasonable argument can be made that the use of DSP-
like48 satellites to cue TMD systems probably violates the ABM 
Treaty. 49 Do the same ABM Treaty restrictions apply because 
the IR system is passive? Herbert Lin suggest that cueing 
systems, whether they are long-range active or passive, are 
unable to provide information precise enough to guide an 
interceptor missile from launch to kill. 50 This assessment is 
not entirely correct today, because it ignores the basing 
mode of the interceptor, battle management efforts, and 
advances in hit-to-kill technology. For example: (1) Joint 
Task Force 95 (JTF), scheduled later this year, will test the 
47Baker Spring, •For Strategic Defense: A New Strategy for the New 
Global Situation,• Tbe Heritage Fgund4tion Backgrounder, 18 April 1991, 
p. 6. 
48DSP-like refers to those early warning types of satellites that 
provide target trajectory information and impact point prediction. 
49rnterview between Baker Spring, The Heritage Foundation, 
Washington, D.C., and the author, 17 May 94. This statement was made in 
the context that DSP satellites used in combination with TMDs present a 
more reasonable argument for a violation of the ABM Treaty, than 
defining the line between TMDs and ABMs. 
SOHerbert Lin, NeW Weapon Tecbnologies, p. 17. He further asserts 
that the information these cueing sensors provide can be passed to the 
sensors cf the TMD system telling the sensors where to look. 
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so-called Cooperative Engagement Capability in which four 
ships will test the ability to engage a target held by 
another platform's sensors; 51 and, (2) the BMDO is evaluating 
BPI concepts that use Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 
equipped with lightweight IR sensors !for target detection 
and tracking) in combination with upward looking tracking 
cameras (to provide trajectory information) to fighters or 
bombers. 52 The premise that IR or other passive sensors, such 
as optical, used alone cannot result in a successful theater 
intercept appears doubtful, because of hit-to-kill technology 
and missile mounted sensors. The IR sensor problem is one 
that is not easily answered, but needs to be addressed in 
future policy decisions. 
Interceptor Mounted Sensors ( IMS) such as IR, 
optical, radar, and ladar53 present an additional ambiguity in 
the technological incrementalism of ballistic missile 
defense. Does the introduction of IMS to the equation of 
theater defenses enhance the footprint size of the defended 
51Barbara Starr, •Navy TMD Waits for Funding, • Jane's Defense 
W§ekly, 12 March 1994, p. 20. 
52·us Evaluates Candidates for TBM Boost-Phase Intercept,• 
International Defense Review, November 1993, p. 850. This article 
further asserts that the UAVs will exchange fire-control information 
with other vehicles in the formation to provide three-dimensional track 
data. 
53rbid., p. 851. Ladar is an acronym for [Laser Radar] employed in 
the terminal phase of the LEAP technology interceptor. See above note 
32; also see the Report to Congress on the Strategic pefense Initiatiye, 
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO), Washington, D.C., 
1993, p. A-2. 
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area? What is range of IMSs, and, can they be electronically 
steered? Can the use of IMS somehow be perceived as 
providing a base for a nationwide defense of territory? The 
use of IMS is probably a precedent for ballistic missile 
defense, but the concept of IMS to provide terminal guidance 
to an interceptor as it closes its target has been used for 
decades. 54 
From the perspective of TMD, the concept of IMS 
may become a problem when used in combination with intercepts 
performed during the boost phase. For example both THAAD and 
ERINT (Extended Range Interceptor) use hit to kill technology 
employing inertially guided interceptors. TMDs that use 
inertially guided interceptors equipped with IMS, in concert 
with airborne search and track sensors, may eliminate the 
need for a ground based radar. Moreover, as the range of the 
IMS improves beyond the range of terminal guidance, then the 
trajectory and impact point prediction of the airborne sensor 
will be less critical. This concept might allow an airborne 
asset to control truck mounted interceptors such as ERI!lT or 
THAAD without the telltale radar. It would use a system 
similar to BPI, except that it could be used in a terminal 
defense mode, but the interceptors would not have to be 
ground mounted. This scenario might provide a clandestine 
base for nationwide defenses in violation of the ABM Treaty. 
54Herbert Lin, New Weapon Technologies, p. 23. 
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2. ABM System Defined? 
Article I of the ABM Treacy ensures that both parties 
undertake not to develop a nationwide missile defense nor 
provide a base for the development of a nationwide defense. 
Perhaps, Article II has been one of the most controversial 
articles because of its association with the so-called 
"broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Clearly, an 
article whose sole function is to define the ABM systems, 
that are prohibited from providing a nationwide defense by 
Article I, should be wit.hout ambiguity. The ambiguous 
elements of Article II are underlined for emphasis: 
1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a 
system to counter strateaig ballistig missiles or 
their elements in flight trajectory, gurrently 
qonsistinq of: 
(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor 
missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of 
a type tested in an ABH mode; 
(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and 
deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and 
(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed 
for ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mgde. 
2. The ABM systems components listed in paragraph 1 of 
this Article include those which are: 
(a) operational; 
(b) under construction; 
(c) undergoing testing; 
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; 
(e) mothballed. 
In short, Article II attempts to define what an ABM 
system is by using a functional definition. The ambiguities 
are: (1) failure to define a strategic ballistic missile; (2) 
whether "currently consisting of• is a function or a 
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limitation; and, (3} the definition of "tested in ABM mode." 
The ambiguities will be each addressed in the following 
sections, with the exception of number one, which will be 
examined under Article VI. 
a. Currently Consisting Of 
Article II of the ABM Treaty describes an ABM s 
ystem as "currently consisting of A~~: interceptor missiles, 
ABM launchers, and ABM radars." It sbc,;.ld be noted that the 
Reagan Administration • s so-called "broad" interpretation of 
the ABM Treaty was the only real challenge to the proper 
meaning of Article II and others. However, Reagan's 
challenge to the Treaty may be an onerous legacy, because one 
of the first things that President Clinton accomplished, upon 
assuming office, was to denounce the "broad" interpretation 
and to take measures to strengthen the ABM Treaty. 55 He 
concomitantly affirmed adherence to the "narrow" 
interpretation of the ~reaty while emphasizing ground-based 
theater defenses and relrygating "Star wars• to research only. 
The •broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty 
originated on October 6, 1985. The then national security 
adviser, Robert McFarlane, during an appearance on "Meet the 
Press,• casually indicated that the Reagan administration had 
SSElizabeth A. Palmer, •clinton Hews to Narrow View On ABM Treaty,• 
Cgngressional Quarterly, 17 July 1993, p. 1894. See also Barbara Opall, 
•ABM Policy Shifts Imperil Clinton's Military Strategy,• Defense News, 4 
October 1993, p. 28. 
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redefined a key obligation of the ABM Treaty. MaFarlane 
declared "that testing and development of ABM systems based 
on 'new physical concepts' was 'approved and authorized by 
the [ABM] treaty' . " 56 The Reagan administration subsequently 
argued that the ABM Treaty allowed testing and development of 
so-called "exotic" ABM systems and components that were not 
deployed when the Treaty was signed in 1972. 57 The 
traditional or "narrow" interpretation of the ABM Treaty 
affirmed that only immobile, ground-based ABM systems or 
components--allowed by Article III--could be developed and 
tested. 
The Reagan Administration arrived at the broad 
interpretation by attempting to show that the phrase 
[currently consisting of: ABM interceptor missiles, ABM 
launchers, and ABM Radars J should be interpreted to mean 
those ABM missiles, launchers, and radars currently available 
in 1972 only. Reagan's legal advisor, Abraham Sofaer 
asserted that Article II is not a functional definition of an 
ABM system but rather is a precise definition of what 
elements the Treaty is intended to cover. 58 Since only 
56Raymond L. Garthoff, Policy Versus the Law; The Reinterpretation 
of the ASM Treaty, The Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 1987, p. 
2-3. 
57 •The ABM Treaty Controversy, • Congressional pigest, November 
1987, p. 264. 
58william J. Durch, Tbe ABM Treaty and Western Security, p. 60. 
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launchers, interceptors, and radars are named, only those 
components are constrained and thus exotics could be tested.:. 
Ignoring the comma preceding the word currently, 
which would make the ABM components only illustrative instead 
of limited, Sofaer proposed to modify the phrase ",currently 
consisting of" by removing the comma and inserting "and ... ..;o 
Whenever ABM opponents have tried to reinterpret 
the ABM treaty in the past, the approach used is to take one 
or more articles out of context. "Each of the substantive 
articles of the accord is key to the whole for each is 
carefully designed to block a potential avenue or 
circumvention. u61 
b. Tested in an ABM Mode 
The phrase "tested in an ABM mode" is ambiguous 
because it is not defined in the ABM Treaty proper. It is 
particularly relevant to TMD because it is the principal 
means by which non-ABM systems are prevented from attaining 
prohibited ABM capability. The phrase is prohibitive because 
it identifies any items as ABM components (other than those 
currently consisting 0f) , if they are "tested in an ABM 
mode." Article VI further supports Article II by affirming 
59rbid. Sofaer claimed that no part of the Treaty proper referred 
to exotics. Only Agreed Statement (D) referred to •future• and to 
•other physical Principles,• therefore the restrictions of Articles I, 
II, III, V, and VI only applied to those systems currently available in 
1972. 
60Raymond L. Garthoff, Policy Versus the Law, p. 25. 
61Matthew Bunn, Foundation for the Future, p. 20. 
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not to test non-ABM systems or components in an ABM mode. 
The clarity of the phrase "tested in an ABM mode" is fm. -:her 
clouded by the lack of a definition of strategic ballistic 
missile. If the definition of an ABM defense is dependent 
upon the functional description of a "system to counter a 
undefined strategic ballistic missile," then when does the 
"tested in an ABM mode" restriction apply to a TMD system? 
These and other unanswered questions are more relevant today, 
because as TMD capability approaches that of an ABM system, 
testing restrictions may inhibit the confidence in, and 
efficacy of, deployed TMD systems. 
The "SAM upgrade" problem and Ballistic Missile 
Early Warning (BMEW) radar was specifically identified as 
vulnerable to testing in an ABM mode. Thus the United States 
insisted on the inclusion of a provision in the treaty that 
prohibited the sides from giving non-ABM missiles, launchers, 
or radars ABM capabilities or testing them "in an ABM mode.• 62 
The u.s. delegation made a statement (Unilateral Statement B) 
describing events that would in its view constitute testing 
in an ABM mode: 
( 1) A launcher is used to launch an ABM interceptor 
missile; ( 2) an interceptor missile is flight tested 
against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory 
with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile 
flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction 
with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM 
62Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, Ballistic Missile 
Defense, p. 230. 
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radar at the same test range, or is f 1 ight tested to 
altitude inconsistent with interception of :argets 
against which air defenses are deployed; ( 3) a radar 
makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the 
kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry 
portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in 
conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile 
or an ABM radar at the same test range. 
There is evidence that the Soviets did not want a precise 
definition of the term "tested in an ABM mode" and, in fact, 
soviet insistence on ambiguous language forced the united 
States to make the above Unilateral Statement.~ 3 
Dailey also presents strong evidence that the 
u.s. initial concern about clarification of "tested in an ABM 
mode" was valid due to numerous Soviet violations as follows: 
(1) testing of SAM interceptors and radars against reentry 
vehicles; (2) netting of various SAM and ABM radars; and, (3) 
ABM Treaty radar violation issues. 64 An Agreed Statement of 
the sec, in 1978, further refined the term •tested in an ABM 
mode" and regulated other operations of air-defense radars at 
ABM test ranges providing in part: 
... is considered to be I tested in an ABM mode I if it 
performs certain functions such as tracking and guiding 
an ABM interceptor missile or tracking strategic 
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory 
in conjunction with an ABM radar which is tracking and 
guiding an ABM interceptor missile ... Tracking alone is 
insufficient for a radar to be tested in an ABM mode; the 
63srian D. Dailey and Patrick J. Parker, Soyiet Strategic 
peception, p. 249. 
64Ibid., 234-37. 
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presence of an ABM interceptor being guided by an ABM 
radar is also required.65 
It is ironic that the same netting of theater defense radars 
with satellites and aircraft today by the United States is 
not addressed by the Russians. 
Finally, Article VI of the ABM Treaty has been 
said to have a double test: it prohibits giving non-ABM 
systems the capabilities to counter strategic systems, and 
the sides are not allowed to II test them in an ABM Mode. 11 " 6 
The Clinton Administration's recent TMD proposal to the sec 
to modify Article VI of the ABM Treaty, would permit 
development of TMD systems if they did not have a 
•demonstrated II capability against a strategic ballistic 
missile. John Rhinelander asserts that, if this proposal is 
accepted, •it will force us to single standard where testing 
is the only real restriction.•67 
3. ABK Component Defined? 
Article III of the ABM Treaty delineates the 
specifics of the one ABM site that is allowed. The site must 
be within a deployment area having a radius of 150 km and 
65Matthew Bunn, Foundation for the Future, p. 81. For further 
refinements on a •reverse-boosted• target, also see Herbert Lin, ~ 
W.apon Tecbnologies, p. 36. 
66John Rhinelander, •A New Threat to the ABM Treaty: The 
Administration's TMD Proposal,• Arms Control t9day, January/February 
1994, p. 14. 
6 7 Ibid. Rhinelander further asserts • that's exactly what we 






on the Party's national capital or within a 
area (also 150 km radius l containing ICBM silo 
ABM components are limited to no more than 100 
launchers and 100 interceptor missiles at each site; LPARs 
and ABM radars are also limited. The opening statement of 
Article III contains the ambiguity: Each Party undertakes not 
to deploy ABM systems or their components except within the 
allowed single site. 
on this article for 
The "broad" interpretation also relied 
support of its assertion that the 
components represented only those components available in 
1972. 
What is the definition of an ABM component? As 
defined by Article II, components are ABM interceptors, 
launchers, and radars constructed and deployed for an ABM 
role, or tested in an ABM mode. The ambigujties represented 
by the phrase "tested in an ABM mode," not withstanding," the 
Article II definition is clouded further by Agreed Statement 
(D), which includes components capable of substituting for 
ABM interceptor missiles, launchers or Radar in the future. 
The question becomes whether ~component" is an element that 
is capable of performing the function of an ABM component, 
and also, when in the development process does the designated 
element become an ABM component. Recent scholars cite the 
difference between a component and an adjunct which would not 
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be limited by the Treaty. 68 An "adjunct" being a system to 
help an ABM system function, without being critical and 
unable tc substitute for an ABM component. An example would 
be a small optical telescope used in conjunction with an ABM 
radar for calibration.o9 
The airborne AWACs or Brilliant Eyes satellite 
·~~~~P.s the line of being an ABM component 
consiae.~. ···~ ;,;.:.a. c. they can direct airborne or ground based 
assets to an incoming ballistic missile. The gray area is 
what systems are components and at what stage of development 
do they become components. Certainly the Unmanned Autominous 
Vehicles (UAVs) as part of the BPI system serve the same 
sensor function as a TMD or ABM radar. If the BPI system is 
developed without modifying the ABM Treaty, will the UAVs be 
labeled as n ABM component because it can serve the same 
function as an ABM radar? The UAVs operating in a net are 
supposedly capable of detecting a ballistic missile launch 
and directing onboard hypervelocity missiles to an intercept 
up to a range of 220 km. The •ABM component• is one of many 
issues that are intensified by technological advancement, yet 
remain unaddressed. 
68Hans Gunter Brauch, ed., Star wars And EuropeAn pefence, p. 392. 
See also William J. Durch, Tbe ABM Treaty, p. 70; and, Raymond Garthoff, 
•correspondence: On Negotiating with the Russians, • International 
Security, Summer 1977, p. 107-109. 
69Hans Gunter Brauch, ed., p. 392. 
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4. Development 
Certain aspects of the ABM Treaty text are referred 
to as "gray areas" because they are unrestrained by the 
treaty, but are similar to the ABM parameters. Herbert Lin 
suggests that a large "gray area" exists between the minimum 
threshold of National Technical Means (NTM) observation 
capabilities and actual component testing in the areas of air 
defense, TMD, and ASAT. 70 In other words, development of gray 
area systems is not likely to be easily observed by 
satellite, so they are not restricted. Although there is not 
a bilateral agreement on the meaning of the term 
"development" in the treaty, there are Unilateral Statements 
that attempt to clarify the meaning. 
The problem with the definition of development, in 
the context of TMD, has been the possibility of clandestine 
ABM component development by one of the parties to the ABM 
Treaty. Since TMD development is one of the gray areas not 
normally monitored by NTM, ambiguity is the result if no 
boundaries are set between development and when a developed 
part reaches ABM component status. No specific agreed 
definition of development was reached during the ABM Treaty 
negotiations. 
During the negotiations, the Americans proposed that 
development is the stage that follows research and that 
70Herbert Lin, New weapon Technology, p. 49. He writes that NTM 
can observe most component testing and a lot more besides that. 
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research includes the conceptual design and laboratory 
testing which precedes field testing.-l Using the BPI 
development as an example, if the BPI is evaluated as non-ABM 
compliant, then it would be allowed under research only, but 
it could not be developed without submission to the Standing 
Consultative Commission for discussion. This is the barrier 
that President Reagan faced when he tried to "develop" 
spaced-based defenses by using the so-called "broad" 
interpretation. The broad interpretation did not stand and 
reaffirmed the ABM Treaty restriction that research on exotic 
weapons is allowed, but II development II is not. Where the 
demarcation line stands between research and development is 
key to the ambiguity as it relates to TMD. 
5. Capability to Counter Strategic Ballistic 
Missiles 
Article VI is currently at the center of the ABM 
controversy between the United States and Russia. 
Historically associated with the •sAM upgrade• problem, 
LPARs, and the •broad• interpretation, today•s focus has 
shifted to TMD. The basic purpose of the article is to 
prohibit non-ABM systems or components from obtaining ABM 
capability. The ambiguous portions of Article VI are 
underlined and highlighted below: 
Each party undertakes not to qiya missiles, launchers, 
or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM 
71Matthew Bunn, Fgun4otion fgr the future, p. 
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launchers, or ABM radars capabilities to counter 
strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in 
flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode. 
Not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of 
strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations 
along the periphery of its national territory and 
oriented outward.12 
The uncertainty about this article is undefined words 
and phrases. In this case, the phrase "not to give missiles, 
launchers, or radars capabilities to counter strategic 
ballistic missiles" is vague, because the phrase "strategic 
ballistic missile" is undefined in the ABM Treaty. So, ABM 
and non-ABM systems are defined by their ability to counter 
strategic ballistic missiles. By inference only, theater 
missile defenses are those systems that do not have a 
capability against strategic ballistic missiles. The current 
theater defense problem arises because the question of "what 
is theater missile defense" cannot be answered without a 
clear definition of a strategic ballistic missile. 
The resultant distinction between what constitutes 
theater missile defense and strategic missile defense is 
undemarcated and unclear. The ABM treaty does not 
specifically mention Theater Missile Defense or Anti-Tactical 
ballistic missile defense. 7 '3 The parties assume that air 
defense and theater defense systems can be developed at will, 
72The ABM treaty, Art VI. 
73The terms Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and Anti-Tactical 
Ballistic Missile (ATBM) defense are used interchangeably. 
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as long they are not given the "capability to counter 
strategic ballistic missiles" and are not "tested in an ABM 
mode." 
Finally, the phrase "capabilities to counter 
strategic ballistic missiles" is also unclear, because the 
word "capabilities" is undefined. This major deficiency in 
the ABM Treaty is detrimental to TMD development and 
deployment, because it leaves unanswered two very important 
questions: ( 1) what is capability to counter an undefined 
target; and, (2) How is capability measured? These and other 
questions are the subject of current negotiations between the 
United States and Russia. 74 
a. What is a Strategic Ballistic Missile? 
What is the definition of a strategic ballistic 
missile in the context of the ABM Treaty? What is the 
definition of a theater ballistic missile, and more 
importantly what is theater ballistic missile defense? There 
are indications that both members of Congress and the 
Department of Defense lack a clear understanding of Ballistic 
Missile Defense (BM0) 7S, the ABM Treaty, and Theater Missile 
Defense (TMD). The comments of Senator Bumpers, from 
Arkansas--a long time opponent of BMD--typifies recent 
7 4Lisbeth Gronlund and others, • Highly Capable Theater Missile 
Defenses and the ABM Treaty,• Arms Cgntrol Tgday, April 1994, p. 3. 
75The terms ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) and BMD (Ballistic Missile 
Defense) are used interchangeably. 
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congressional debate on TMD funding. Senator Bumper's 
professed lack of knowledge on the subject does not appear to 
be just a ploy for effect: 
Mr. President, I do not mind telling you I am so weary. I 
have stood behind this desk now for five years and taken 
this on. Senator Johnston, one of the most knowledgeable 
members in this Senate on SDI, actually understands a lot 
of the technology. I confess, I do not. All I know is 
they have tried every technology under the shining sun, 
and they have just discarded them one after another, the 
technology. We have gone from Brilliant Pebbles now to 
Brilliant Eyes. What is that? What are Brilliant Eyes? 76 
The reality of Senator Bumper's comments is not very far from 
the truth. The nation's program for development of ballistic 
missile defenses changed dramatically over the last ten years 
and a complete understanding by all policy makers should not 
be assumed. 
A strategic ballistic missile is not defined in 
the ABM treaty. Various authors cite the definition of 
strategic as being defined in other documents signed 
concurrently with the ABM treaty such as the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT) . 77 The most commonly accepted 
definition of strategic ballistic missiles, when referring to 
land-based Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), is 
the ability to attack the •heartland• of another country or 
76congressional Record, 9 September 1993, p. S11248. 
77see Duncan Lennox, •Battling With the Ballistic Threat,• Jane's 
Defense Weekly, 20 March 1993, p. 25. See also Sidney Graybeal and 
Patricia McFate, pefense News, November 15, 1993, p. 33. and Peter 
Zimmerman, •Key Point on ABM,• pefen•e News, November 15, 1993, p. 34. 
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as having a range greater than 5500 km. 78 Since the ability 
to attack the "heartland" of another country would include 
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and Air-
Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) over 600 km in range, 
strategic ballistic missiles may have a range considerably 
shorter than 5500 km; in some cases the range may be as short 
as 600 km. 
The major differentiation problem with theater 
missile defenses is that the ranges of strategic missiles and 
theater missile are not defined in the ABM Tre·aty. The 
question of range is not addressed; in fact, the ABM Treaty 
simply requires that theater defense radar, missiles and 
launchers are not to be given capabilities to counter 
strategic ballistic missiles and that they not be tested in 
an "ABM mode." The only definition that can be drawn from 
the ABM treaty is a capability-based definition based on the 
capability of a missile defense system to counter a strategic 
ballistic missile. Various authors explain that the 
ambiguities in the ABM Treaty attempted to protect u.s. and 
soviet options to deploy Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile 
(ATBM) systems, while simultaneously confin~ng non-ABM 
systems to less full ABM capabilities. 79 
78tbid. 
79william J. Durch, The ABM Treaty and wastern Security, Cambridge, 
Mass: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988, p. 53. Durch elaborates tha·.: 
1000 km should be the cutoff range of ballistic missiles against which 
defenses could be deployed without constraint by the treaty. P. 121. 
Sea also Gerard Smith, poubla Talk, Lanham, MD: University Press of 
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The ambiguity in the ABM Treaty as it relates to 
TMD is troubling because the distinction between strategic 
and theater ballistic missiles has changed significantly 
since the ABM Treaty was negotiated in 1972. ICBMs can be 
fired at ranges considerably below 5500 km and tactical or 
theater ballistic missiles can be fired at ranges between 300 
and 3500 km. So the answer to the question of "at what 
ballistic missile range do we allow a TMD system to have a 
capability to defend?" can not be answered by referring to 
the ABM treaty. 
b. What is Theater? 
The TMD dilemma for the United States is caused 
by the lack of a definition of theater ballistic missile 
defense. Clearly, many so-called theater defensive missile 
systems are in development throughout the world today without 
any restraint. Theater ballistic missiles have changed 
considerably, since the ABM Treaty was negotiated in 1972, 
with some theater missiles now equaling the least capable 
strategic missiles existing at that time. Because TMD is not 
defined in the ABM Treaty, unrestrained development and 
capability could lead to abrogation of the ABM Treaty between 
the United States and Russia. Perception by parties to the 
treaty of a TMD system that has a capability (even if 
America, 1985, p. 314; and, Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, 
eds., Ballistic Misaile Defense, Washington, D.C., The Brookings 
Institute, 1984, p. 230. 
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undefined) against a strategic ballistic missile, 
historically, produced more than II just cause for concern. II 80 
The Department of Defense (DOD) has used 
unofficial and self imposed restraints to distinguish between 
tests against strategic and theater missile targets. By 
constraining the target speed and altitude to which a theater 
system could be tested, the DOD by practice, established TMD 
parameters as a demonstrated capability against a target 
traveling two km/sec or less and not more than 40 km 
altitude. Michael Krepon asserts that: 
Shortly after the ABM Treaty was signed, the Defense 
Department developed internal guidelines for developing 
and testing missile interceptors to assure conformity 
with the u.S. interpretation of treaty constraints. 
These guidelines required that any planned tests against 
targets traveling more than two kilometers per second 
and altitudes of more than 40 km be submitted for review 
by a Pentagon compliance committee. 81 
The so-called "Foster Box" criteria (theater missile target 
test limit of-2 km/sec and 40 km altitude) was established in 
1972 by then-Director ot !Jefense Research and Engineering 
John Foster. 82 There is no evidence that the former Soviet 
Union adhered to this criteria.B3 
80MAtthew Bunn, Foundation for the Future, p. 104-106. See also 
Brian Dailey, •Deception, Perceptions Management, and self-Deception in 
Arms Control: An examination of the ABM Treaty,• in Dailey and Parker, 
Soviet Strategic Deception, p. 235. 
81Michael Krepon, •Effective Theater Missile Defense Need not 
Undermine ABM,• Defense News, 14 February 1994, p. 25. 
82Lisbeth Gronlund, and others, •Highly Capable Theater Missile 
Defenses And the ABM Treaty,• Arms Contrgl Tgdoy, April 1994, p. 4. 
83Michael Krepon, •Effective Theater Missile Defense Need Not 
Undermine ABM,• p. 25. 
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The United States has endeavored to remain within 
its own self imposed restraints on TMD capabilities, but new 
TMD systems in development by the United States may have a 
capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles. The 
Theater High Altitude Area Defense 1 THAAD) system may be 
capable of defending against tactical ballistic missiles with 
ranges up to 3, 500 km and maximum velocities up to five 
km/sec (i.e., Chinese CSS-2) . 84 Under its current design, the 
THAAD system cannot be tested to its optimal capability, 
because of self imposed DOD restraints on velocities and 
range. Efforts to establish a distinction between theater 
and strategic missiles is difficult based on speed and 
altitude, because of similarities in performance 
characteristics. Table II illustrates the range of 
parameters involved. 
Table II indicates that attempting to draw the 
line that separates theater from strategic missiles based on 
range alone is p=oblematic because of the indeterminate range 
of SLBMs and the identification of individual systems. For 
example, if THAAD has a capability to counter a so-called 
theater missile of 3000 km range, then surely it would also 
have a capability against the SS-N-5 and the SS-N-6 strategic 
ballistic missiles. 
84sidney Graybeal and Patricia McFate, •Redefine Theater Defense,• 
pefense News, 15 November 93, p. 33. 
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Source: Herbert Lin, New weapon Tecbnologies & Tbe A8M Treaty, Pergamon-
Brassey• International Defense Publishers, Mclean, VA., 1988, p. 13. 
For missiles, Lin assumed minimum-energy trajectories in a vacuum for 
the range-speed-apogee relations. 
Note: Pershing II was considered a tactical missile. 
Several of the self-imposed treaty restraints may 
inhibit technical advancements. "The Treaty already has 
interfered with the development of missile defense systems,• 
Rep. Jon Kyl, R-Ariz., said in an August 12 interview. "We 
have had to conduct tests in odd ways to comply with the 
Treaty." 85 At a recent Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
85Quoted in Neil Munro and Vago Muradian, •u.s. View On ABM Tre,ty 
May Kill Programs,• Defense Ngws, 16 August 1993, p.l. The article goes 
on to say that •Depending on how the treaty is interpreted and enforced 
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Hearing, when Senator Paul Simon (D-ILl asked whether it was 
true that: "if we don It modify the treaty, we can It develop 
THAAD?" Holum replied, "correct." 
Daniel Graham (Former director, Defense 
Intelligence Agency) echoes the sentiment felt by TMD 
supporters: 
our technology is outpacing the treaty. The line between 
strategic and tactical capabilities has been blurred 
almost beyond recognition ... and the sad fact is we Ire 
having to dumb down our systems in order to comply with 
an outmoded treaty. 86 
The United States is attempting to draw the line 
that separates theater from strategic missile defense. The 
Clinton administration recently made a proposal to Russia via 
the sec to modify the ABM Treaty including a recommenda~ion 
that new agreed definitions be adopted to "clarify" how to 
interpret the treaty. 87 The United States proposed that a 
permitted interceptor be defined as one with a "demonstrated" 
capability to intercept a target re-entering the atmosphere 
at a velocity of up to 5 km per second (the velocity of the 
CSS-2) . 88 Reportedly, the administration did not propose an 
it could block development of spaced-, sea- and even mobile ground-based 
missile defense systems that have long range or high altitude 
capabilities.• 
86Ibid. Quoted by Barbara Opall in a 13 September, 1993 interview 
with Daniel Graham. 
87Lisbeth Gronlund and others, •Highly Capable Theater Missile 
Defenses and the ABM Treaty,• Arms Control TQdoy, April 1994, p. 3. 
88see Dunbar lockwood, •u.s. Proposal to Retool ABM Treaty Reopens 
Debate on Missile Defense,• Arms Control Today, January/February 1994, 
p. 24; and, Theresa Hitchens and Barbara Opall, "THAAD May be Treaty 
Debate Fulcrum,• Qefense News, 11 April 1994, p. 1. 
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altitude restriction, but while agr~eing that clarification 
of the treaty is necessary, the Russians argued that the 
single criterion of velocity was insufficient. The 
administration's interest in the proposal is heightened by 
its desire to develop the THAAD system to counter missiles of 
up to 3500 km range.l?9 This dilemma, according to Theresa 
Hitchens, in the U.S.-Russian talks to revise the ABM Treaty: 
•may force the u.s. government to choose between a sure deal 
to protect THAAD or gamble on a strategy to include future 
Navy and Air Force systems ... 9o 
several authors have suggested range and 
capability-based distinctions to define the difference 
between strategic and other ballistic missiles. William Durch 
recommends 1000 km as a cutoff for the range of ballistic 
missiles against which defenses could be deployed without 
constraint by the ABM Treaty. He justifies this range limit 
as a figure compatible with the 1000 km floor of the 
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 91 Herbert Lin 
concludes that verifiable limits on TMD systems might be 
established using capability-based measures: ( 1) limits on 
89nunbar Lockwood, •senators Appear Skeptical of 
Modifications,• Arms Control Today, April 1994, p. 17. 
vehicle speed of a 3500 mile missile is roughly five km per 
minimum energy trajectory. 
ABM Treaty 
The reentry 
second for a 
90Theresa Hitchens and Barbara Opall, •THAAD Mat be Treaty Debate 
Fulcrum,• Qefense News, 17 April 1994, p. 1. 
91william J. Durch, Tb• AIM T;eaty and W.•tern Security, p. 121. 
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the physical size of interceptor missiles; ( 2) limits on 
missile kinematics; and, (3) limits on power-aperture product 
of mobile radars. 92 The suggested capability measures apply 
only to the capabilities of the interceptor, and not to the 
interceptor capability against a strategic missile. 
Clearly, the United States and other countries 
need to have a system to defend against use of tactical 
ballistic missiles in future regional conflicts. However, 
the consequences of unrestrained unilateral TMD development 
will make the distinction between tactical and strategic 
missiles less clear. If TMD systems are not limited by 
capability or range-based system design, then no restraints 
will exist to limit the ability of TMD systems to counter 
strategic ballistic missiles. 
c. Demonstrated Capability Vs Inherent 
Capability 
Another area of contention, that surfaced in the 
administration's ABM Treaty modification proposal, was the 
introduction of the term "demonstrated capability." The ABM 
Treaty prohibition forbids that non-ABM systems be given 
•capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles.• The 
Clinton administration has proposed that the "capability 
92Herbert Lin, Naw weapon Technologies, p. 45-48. •Lin suggests a 
ceiling on power-aperture product for all mobile radar, based on the 
estimated product of the Patriot air defense radar. The suggested 
volume/length limit on SAMs and TMD interceptors would be eight meters 
in length and 2.5 cubic meters in volume. For testing limits Lin would 
define an 'ABM target' as an object that achieves either a speed in 
excess of three km/sec or an altitude of greater than 70 km.• 
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prohibition on TMDs be dropped in favor of a "demonstrated 
capability" prohibition. 93 This distinction would allow the 
theoretical development of TMD systems that would be regarded 
as a theater, and not a strategic system, as long as it is 
never tested (demonstrated} against a target with a reentry 
speed greater than five km per second. 94 
Opposition to the Clinton administration's 
proposal is not just from the Russians. Arms control 
advocates assert that systems like THAAD and the proposed 
sea-based upper-tier definitely have a capability against 
strategic ballistic missiles.9S If the United States is 
allowed to develop and deploy systems such as THAAD that 
possess a capability against strategic ballistic missiles, as 
long as it does not test them against a target traveling more 
than five km per second. This scenario generates the 
capability versus intent argument all over again. This is 
93Lisbeth Gronlund and others, •Highly Capable Missile Defenses and 
the ABM Treaty,• Arms Control T9day, April 1994, p. 4. See also Theresa 
Hitchens, •Treaty Rewrite Would Bolster Tactical Defenses, • pefense 
~. 20 December 1993, p. 4. 
94Ibid. The authors suggest that •the Clinton administration has 
concluded that such an agreed interpretation, together with the change 
to a 'demonstrated capability' prohibition is necessary to allow the 
United States to conduct tests of the THAAD system--scheduled to begin 
later this year--without violating the ABM Treaty.• 
95Interview between John Pike, Director of the Space policy 
Project, The Federation of American Scientist, Washington, D.c., and the 
Author, 21 April 1994. For a recent study (by the Arms Control 
Association) that concludes that THAAD will have a significant 
capability against strategic ballistic missiles, sea Lisbeth Gronlund 
and others, •Highly Capable Theater Missile Defenses and the ABM 
Treaty,• Arm• Contrgl Tgday, April 1994, p. 3. 
so 
the same capability-versus-intent argument used by the united 
States against the former Soviet Union's Backfire Bomber.~~ 
Jack Mendelsohn captures the essence of the opposition for 
the arms control community: 
This means that a super-capable ATBM, which we all know 
would have ABM capability, would not be in violation of 
the treaty unless it actually demonstrated this 
capability. This is the old •capability-versus-intent• 
argument, and the United States, over time, constantly 
used the capability argument and not the intent argument 
as a basis for posing challenges. 97 
Congressional opposition hinges on whether the magnitude of 
the proposed change to the ABM Treaty will require Senate 
advice and consent. In a letter to President Clinton on 25 
March, 1994, all 44 Republican Senators urged him to resist 
any restrictions on TMD systems beyond the original u.S. 
proposal. 98 In addition the letter alerted the president that 
"there is an emerging consensus in the Senate that any 
agreement to substantially modify the ABM treaty should be 
submitted by the Administration for advice and consent." 99 
96oepartment gf Defense, •soviet Strategic and Space Programs, • 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1990, p. 4. The U.S. 
asserted that this bomber is capable of performing a one way strategic 
mission against the U.s., but the Soviets claimed the bomber was 
intended for tactical missions only. 
97Jack Mendels~hn and others, •A New Threat to the ABM Treaty: The 
Administration's TMD Proposal,• Apms Contrgl Tgday, January/February 
1994, p. 13. 
98Dunbar Lockwood, •u.s. Rejects Moscow's Proposal To Limit ATBM 
Interceptor Speeds,• Apms Cgntrgl Tgday, May 1994, p. 19. 
99Ibid. 
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Some TMD proponents argue that the capability of 
the THAAD system against a strategic ballistic missile is 
"highly overstated. oolOO Baker Spring admits, that the THAAD 
system "probably has some capability against a strategic 
ballistic missile, but only from a military sense, and not a 
political one." 10l In other words, we would have to possess 
the political will (a.k.a., intent) to deploy THAAD to 
provide that "base" for a nationwide defense of territory. 
The administration wants to develop THAAD and other systems 
of similar capability, so they have proposed the ABM treaty 
modifications as a clarification via the sec, rather than as 
an amendment, ostensibly to avoid Congressional ratification. 
In summary, Article VI of the ABM Treaty is 
ambiguous today. Because this article is clouded by the lack 
of a definition for "capability against strategic ballistic 
missiles,• it is probably perceived as providing the greatest 
possibility of providing a breakout from the ABM Treaty. The 
very fact that the administration's proposal clouds the issue 
further, by adding a third complication of •demonstrated 
capability," will not likely be successful in today•s arms 
reduction environment. Additionally, an irrefutable argument 
made by John Rhinelander is that the dual restrictions of 
Article VI--the prohibition of ABM capability and testing in 
100rnterview between Baker Spring, Senior Policy Analyst, The 




an ABM mode--will be abrogated and eliminate the double 
standard: 
These dual restrictions are critically important and if 
you modify treaty text so that capabilities must be 
demonstrated, you have effectively gone to a single 
standard where testing is the only real restriction. 
This is exactly what we avoided in for good reasons 
during SALT I negotiations. 1o2 
Both critics and proponents agree that the ABM Treaty is 
sorely in need of change, but it appears that the specifics 
of any compromise will not take the form or perspective of 
the administration's proposal. 
C. SUMMARY: CBANGBS NBBDBD 
This chapter was a thorough review of the ABM Treaty as 
it relates to TMD. The original premise that the treaty is 
still ambiguous in the same areas perceived to be ambiguous 
in 1972 is supported by the review. It is noteworthy that 
the attachments to the treaty containing seven Agreed 
Statements, five Common Understandings, and four Unilateral 
Statements were mostly written to clarify ambiguities 
pertaining to ABM defenses. Yet many of ambiguities, 
previously considered applicable only to ABM systems, were 
demonstrated to be applicable to today' s TMD as well. 
Although the review only concentrated on the first six 
102John Rhinelander, •A New Threat to the ABM Treaty: The 
Administration's TMD Proposal,• Arms Control Tgday, January/February 
1994, p. 14. 
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articles of the treaty, the majority of items considered 
ambiguous were examined for applicability to TMD. 
The ABM Treaty is unclear in many areas but its three 
major deficiencies are: (1) undefined terms and phrases; (2) 
the functional nature of the treaty; and (3) length of treaty 
text. 
The review revealed that the treaty contains more than 10 
ambiguous words and phrases that directly affect the 
distinction between a TMD and an ABM system. Many of these 
ambiguous words and phrases are directly affecting the 
development of planned u.s. systems today. Unanswered 
questions remain about the BMDO meeting the THAAD flight-test 
schedule because of treaty concerns. It appears that the 
treaty is effective in restricting systems that are obviously 
ABM systems such as LPARs, but lacking for those systems that 
would be capable of substituting for LPARs, such as the 
Brilliant Eyes satellite. 
The functional nature of the ABM Treaty served it well 
over the years. Proponents often make the argument that this 
is the strength of the treaty; it prohibits an ABM system by 
defining the prohibited function instead of the prohibited 
system (e.g., an ABM system is a system able to counter a 
strategic ballistic missile). These arguments are correct, 
but to remain effective, the treaty should be modified 
periodically to handle technological advancements. My 
premise is that the treaty is ill-suited to restrain today•s 
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TMD and is overdue for modification. In the case of THAAD, 
BPI, and Navy upper-tier TMD systems, capability "to counter 
strategic ballistic missiles," is inherent to these systems 
and is no longer the question for TMD. 
The brevity of the ABM Treaty, surprising by today • s 
standards, is probably its greatest weakness. Brevity is not 
normally cause for ambiguity, but the ABM Treaty, at roughly 
6 pages of text, is dwarfed by the INF {90 pages) and START I 
{ 250 pages) treaties. Additionally the main causes for 
ambiguity in the ABM Treaty are corrected in START and other 
arms control treaties. The ABM Treaty is only 22 years old, 
but it appears to be much older in terms of handling 
technological advancements. 
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III. CORRB!rl' TBBATBR SYSTBMS &: TBB ABM TRBATY 
In May, 1993 United States shifted ballistic missile 
defense priorities from a National Missile Defense program, 
which would use some spaced based assets, to a ground-based 
program with Theater Missile Defense (TMDl as a priority. 
Today•s •terminal defense• systems are designed to intercept 
ballistic missiles in the final two minutes of flight. Some 
proposed TMD systems, such as Boost Phase Intercept (BPI), 
target the threat missile in the first two minutes of flight. 
The Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDOl is 
currently developing its so-called • core programs •: the 
Patriot PAC-)103, the u.S. Navy's lower-tier system, and the 
Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) . Long-term 
projects include the Navy's sea-based upper-tier, Boost Phase 
Intercept (BPI), and the Army's Corps surface-to-Air Missile 
(Corps SAM). The Upper-Tier (UT) and Lower-Tier (UTl 
designations refer respectively to exoatmospheric (>100 km) 
and endoatmospheric (<100 kmi range capability. Table III 
delineates America's theater missile defense systems under 
consideration or development. 
103rt appears that the Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT) will now 
replace the Patriot PAC-3 as the lower-tier portion of the Army's 
theater missile defense effort. See I:l'l.·.·id Hughes, •Army Selects ERINT 
Pending Pentagon Review,• Ayiation We-& i Space Taghnplogy, 21 February 
1994, p. 93. 
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TABLE III: 0. S. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS 
Svstem Service/Tier warhead*/Ranae Deolovment 
Core Programs 
THAAD Army/UT HTK/ 160 km 2001 # 
Navy SM2 BK-4A Navy/LT Frag/Mid endo 1999 ** 
Patriot PAC-2 Army/LT Frag/ 70 km 1995 
Patriot PAC-3 Army/LT HTK/ Mid endo 1998 
Hawk Upgrades USMC/LT Frag/ 35 km 1995-98 
Israeli Arrow --/UT Frag/ 90 km 1995-99 
I~~b;c.QlQWl: 
DemQnstratQrs 
Navy SM-2 LEAP Navy/UT HTK/ >150 km Aquire/Demo 
CORPS SAM Army/LT -- 30-40 km Study 
Peregrine AF/BPI -- 250 km Study 
RAPTOR/TALON AF/BPI HTK/ 220 km study 
Airborne Laser AF/BPI -- -- Studv 
Source: David Hughes, "BMDO Under Pressure To Set Priorities,• Ayiation 
Week & Space Technology, 17 January 1994, p. 49; •us Evaluates 
Candidates for Boost Phase Intercept,• International pefense Reyiew, 
November 1993, p. 850; Joseph Lovece, "Theater Missile Defense •core• 
Will Cost $21 Billion,• Pefense Week, 14 February 1994, p. 1; Robert 
Holzer and Barbara Opal!, •u.s. Navy Fights BMDO for Antimissile Funds,• 
pefense NeWS, 11 April 1994, p. 8. 
Notes: (I) A government option for 40 missiles, two radars, and two 
(BMC3), deliverable in 1996, can be exercised. (**) Contingency availability in limited numbers-1997/98. 
(*) Warhead type (HTK) = Hit-To-Kill; (Frag) = Fragmentation. 
RAPTOR = Responsive Aircraft Programs for Theater Operations. 
TALON =Theater Applications-Launch ON Notice (3.3 km/sec msl). 
Table III depicts concerted u.s. TMD development. Not 
counting the Patriot multimode seeker, which was eliminated 
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in favor of the ERINT104 as a LT backup to THAAD, there are 
five core programs planned for full scale development. 
There are six TMD systems under study for possible future 
development, for a total of 11 systems being funded by the 
United States. The Israeli Arrow program is also majority 
funded by the United States with a requested budget of $52 
million dollars submitted by the BMDO for FY 1995.:os 
Although not included in Table III, the Brilliant Eyes 
satellite program is reportedly still targeted by BMDO as an 
acquisition program with a requested funding level of $120 
million in FY 1995. 106 In summary, funding restraints will be 
a major issue in the near future. A 1993 study conducted by 
the Congressional Budget Office revealed that current 
administration budget projections and deployment schedules 
through 1999, will only support funding for two of three TMD 
•core• programs (THAAD and PAC-3) .101 
Both the Navy and the Army have upper-tier and lower-tier 
TMD systems under consideration. The CORPS SAM is also a 
104•Loral Gains Ballistic Missile Upper Hand,• Defense Electronics, 
May 1994, p. 10. 
105Joseph Lovece, •Theater Missile Defense •core• Programs Will 
Cost $21 Billion,• Qafense Week, 14 February 1994, p. 1. 
106Joseph Lovece, •Missile Defense Budget Avoids Making the Hard 
Choices,• Qefense WQek, 8 February 1994, p. 5. 
107oavid Mosher, •Theater Ballistic Missile Defenses: Selected 
Issues,• Congrassional Budget Office Staff M§mpran4um, Washington, D.C., 
July 1993, p. 16. This study assumes funding for required battle 
management, and that funding for non-'IMD defenses remains at levels 
requested by the Administration for 1994 and adjusted for inflation; 
funding for all other TMD programs is eliminated. 
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lower-tier systems under study by the U.s. Army as a 
replacement for the US Army and Marine Corps HAWK systems. 
The three BPI systems, enumerated in Table IV, do not account 
for the air-to-air interceptor modifications necessary to 
employ the Air Force Is Peregrine concept. The following 
sections will assess the impact of United States I TMD 
programs on the ABM Treaty. 
A. ARB TODAY' S TMDs CAPABLE AGAINST STRATEGIC 
BALLISTIC MISSILES? 
Determining if a TMD system can intercept a strategic 
ballistic missile is a multi-faceted problem. Assumptions of 
detection range, target characteristics, interceptor 
uncertainties, external cueing, and the shape and location of 
the protected area relative to both the target and 
interceptor launch sites are the major variables108. A recent 
study completed by TMD opponents used the defended THAAD 
"footprint" --the ground area the interceptor can protect 
against an attacking missile--as a key measure of capability 
against strategic ballistic missiles. 109 The study assumes 
one attacking warhead at a time, and did not include the 
possible effects of nuclear weapons, such as salvage fusing 
108•sallistic Missile Defense• Testimony Before the Cgmmittee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Statement by Brad Hathaway, 
General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C., GAO/T-NSIAD-94-167, 3 May 
1994, p. 7. 
109Lisbeth Gronlund and others, "Highly Capable Theater Missile 
Defenses and the ABM Treaty,• Arms Control Today, April 1994, p. 3. 
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or nuclear blast keep-out zones. Sidney Graybeal, a former 
U.S. ABM Treaty Negotiator, admits that THAAD probably has 
some capability against a strategic ballistic missile in a 
one-on-one isolated attack, but that "stand-a-lone footprint 
analysis should not be used as a measure of 
capability .... Capability is determined by National Technical 
Means (NTM) , not by computer analysis ... uo 
Both critics and proponents of TMD acknowledge that THAAD 
has some capability against a strategic ballistic missile.lll 
The trouble with the current analysis of today's TMD 
capability against a strategic ballistic missile is the same 
ambiguous word "capability," that so plagued the ABM Treaty 
negotiations over the years. In other words, the critics of 
today' s TMD hinge their argument on the same undefined 
•capability to counter a strategic ballistic missile,• that 
promotes unrestrained TMD development. John Pike, of the 
Federation of American Scientists, believes we have developed 
too much "capability" for the threat which "on the most part, 
consists of ballistic missiles with ranges less than a 1,000 
kilometers. "112 
110Interview between Sidney Graybeal, Senior Scientist, Science 
Applications International, Mclean, VA., and the Author, 23 May 1994. 
111Theresa Hitchens and Barbara Opal!, •THAAD May Be Treaty Debate 
Fulcrum,• pafense News, 11 April 1994, p. 1; Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., •A 
New Threat to the ABM Treaty: The Administration's TMD Proposal,• ~ 
Control Today, January/February 1994, p. 11; and, Interview between 
Baker Spring, The Heritage Foundation, and the author, 29 April 1994. 
112Interview between John Pike, The Federation of American 
Scientists, Washington, D.C., and the Author, 21 April 94. See also 
60 
Does the capability to counter a conventionally armed 
ballistic missile also mean capability against a nuclear 
armed strategic ballistic missile? Any rigid analysis of TMD 
"capability" against a conventionally armed ballistic 
missile, can not use the same assumptions for a nuclear 
strategic ballistic missile because of differences in warhead 
blast zones. This section attempts to analyze whether 
current U.S. systems have a "capability to counter a 
strategic ballistic missile, " by the use of a model that 
combines a standard surface-to-air interceptor problem, that 
is overlaid with nuclear blast keep-out zones for three 
typical size nuclear weapons. This type of examination 
attempts to take the analysis beyond what Sidney Graybeal 
refers to as "the problem with drawing footprints in 
isolation ... literally, even a rock has a footprint .... "113 In 
short, this type of model addresses the differences in 
intercepting conventionally armed RVs versus nuclear armed 
RVs when assessing TMD capability against strate~i~ ballistic 
missiles. Since the typical TMD system is designed to 
counter conventionally armed theater ballistic missiles, any 
assessment of TMD capability against strategic ballistic 
missiles must consider nuclear blast effects. 
Steven A. Hidreth, •The ABM Treaty and Theater Missile Defense: Proposed 
Changes and Potential Implications,• U.S. Library of Congress 
Congressignal Research Seryice, CRS report 94-379F, Washington, D.C., 5 
May 1994, p. 12 
113rnterview between Sidney Graybeal and the Author, 23 May 1994. 
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The use of salvage fusing as a countermeasure against 
ballistic missile defense should be considered, if nuclear 
reentry vehicles are intercepted by TMD missiles, in close 
proximity to the impact point. "Salvage fusing is the 
technigue of programming a warhead so that it detects when it 
is about to be destroyed by enemy defenses and automatically 
explodes so as to cause damage to the defenses rather than 
just being neutralized." 114 The effects of the nuclear blast 
could be just as devastating as no defense at all. 
When TMD systems are perceived as having the "capability 
to counter a strategic ballistic missile," and therefore 
providing a "base" for a nationwide ABM defense of territory, 
their ABM role is assumed. But, a TMD system would still 
have to cope with possible countermeasures. ABM 
countermeasures such as defense saturation, decoys, radar 
blackout, jamming, Electromagnetic Pulse ( EMP) , radar 
vulnerability, defense leakage, and salvage fusing would 
comprise major offensive measures that could be taken against 
an assumed TMD. A covert TMD might deal with some 
countermeasures, but the prospect of salvage fusing would 
render some TMD systems useless due to the close proximity of 
the TMD interceptor to the impact point at RV interception. 
114Alun Chalfont, Star wars; Suicide or Suryiyal, Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson Limited, London, 1985, p. 90. See also Robert M. Lawerence, 




Nuclear weapons detonations in the atmosphere produce 
blast waves, thermal radiation and nuclear radiation, but 
damage criteria are generally based on the blast wave 
overpressure. 115 Figure 1 illustrates the relationship of 
overpressure to distance from explosions of different yields. 















Figure 1: Relationship of overpressure to Distance 
from Nuclear Explosions of Different Yields 
source: Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., Ballistic Missile 
pefense, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 54. 
Atmospheric pressure assumed at sea-level. 
115Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., Ballistic Missile 
pefense, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 53. 
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The overpressure measured in pounds per square inch (psi) is 
a function of weapon yield measured in megatons (MT) and the 
range from the burst. 116 
In this example, the so-called "keep-out" zone will be 
one psi overpressure, for an assumed population defense with 
minimal damage. Table IV illustrates the severity of the 
winds generated by an overpressure of five psi. 
TABLE IV: OVERPRESSURE AND MAXIMUM WIND VELOCITY IN 
AIR AT SEA LEVEL CALCULATED FOR AN IDEAL SROCK FRONT 
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Source: Samuel Glasstone and Phillip J. Dolan, eds., Tbe Effects of 
Nuclear WeApons, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 1977, p. 82. 
Within a nuclear weapon blast ring where the blast 
overpressure is five psi, nearly all conventional houses will 
116rbid. 
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be damaged beyond repair. 117 At distances from the nuclear 
burst, where the blast overpressure is one psi, the 
destructive effect of the air blast wave is minor.llS If the 
intent of TMD development is eventual ABM capability, then 
the "keep-out" zone of one psi should be adequate for 
population defense. 
For each major TMD system listed in Table III, the one-
psi keep-out zones for a 10 MT, one MT, and 100 KT explosion 
are overlaid on the standard surface-to-air missile intercept 
diagram as a measure of effectiveness. This method is 
similar to an approach used by Herbert Lin to examine the 
performance of SAM systems against ABMs in 1988. 119 The major 
assumptions are as follows: (1) The incoming nuclear reentry 
vehicle is salvaged fused; (2) The major effect from the 
nuclear explosions will be the blast effect--all other 
effects are assumed minor; (3) one attacking warhead at a 
time; (4) the TMD system is assumed to be EMP protected; (5) 
each interceptor missile is assumed to have 100 percent 
reliability from launch to intercept; and, ( 6) the 
interceptor is assumed to be located at the impact point. 
117samuel Glasstone, ed., Tbe Effects of NYclear Weapons, United 
States Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C., 1962, p. 629. The 
author further asserts: •apart from fortuitous circumstances, few 
persons will survive who have not sought protection in strong structures 
or shelters which will withstand the fire, blast, and shock and which 
will attenuate the radiation.• 
118Ibid. 
119Hebert Lin, New we4pon Technologies, p. 76. 
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1. 'l'BAAD 
Theater ballistic missile defense development in the 
United States uses a terminal defense model that consist of 
two or more layers of missile interceptors. This model 
arranges to have two or more shots at a reentry vehicle (RV), 
by providing two hurdles for the offense. 12° The layers are 
referred to as the upper tier--meaning exoatmospheric or area 
defense--and lower tier--meaning endoatmospheric or point 
defense. 121 The u.S. ARMY and the Navy are planning to 
develop both upper and lower tier defenses. 
THAAD is the Army's upper tier and the first system 
ever developed for endoatmospheric and exoatmospheric defense 
against theater ballistic missiles. The system consists of 
interceptor missiles, launchers, Battle Management/Command, 
Control, Communications and Intelligence (BM/C3) units and 
the TMD-Ground Based Radar (TMD-GBR). THAAD is an area 
defense system expected to deploy as a truck-mounted launcher 
carrying 12 missiles and capable of being air-transportable. 
THAAD reportedly will be able to defend a large area with a 
radius of at least 160 km. The system's long interceptor 
range will supposedly give the THAAD system at least two 
120Ashton B. Carter, -BMD Applications: Performance and 
Limitations,• in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, eds., 8a*listic 
Missile Defense, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 
104. 
121Exoatmospheric generally refers to the region above the 
atmosphere normally greater than 100 km; endoatmc.spheric refers to 
inside the atmosphere and generally less than 100 km. 
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shots at an incoming RV . 122 Additionally, the THAAD system 
will perform in concert with external sensors and lower-tier 
defenses (i.e., Brilliant Eyes, Patriot, and Corps SAM) to 
engage and neutralize incoming missiles.l23 
The THAAD system has not been flight tested, but it 
reportedly is designed to intercept theater ballistic 
missiles that have a range of up to 3500 km. The 3500 km 
range is important because the speed of the incoming RV, at 
3500 km, is about five km/sec--the Clinton administration's 
proposed maximum RV speed for TMD demarcation in the ABM 
Treaty. Its a highly capable interceptor that employs hit-
to-kill (HTK) technology, reaches speeds of 2.5 to 2.7 krn per 
second, and intercepts incoming missiles up to 100 miles 
downrange.l24 The missile consists of a single-stage solid 
propellant rocket motor and a kill vehicle; the kill vehicle 
separates from the booster and employs an infrared seeker 
prior to impact. THAAD's planned deployment is scheduled for 
2001, but a so-called User Operational Evaluation System 
(UOES)--can be delivered at the end of the 
l22coL. w. Fredrick Kilgore, "Theater High Altitude Area Defense 
Pro~ ram, • A U.S. Army White Paper, THAAD Project Office, Huntsville, 
AL., 4 February 1994 p. 1. 
123Ibid. This system interoperability will provide an opportunity 
for three shots at an incoming missile in some cases. 
124oavid Hughes, "BMDO Under Pressure to Set TMD Priorities, • 
Ayiation W@ek & Space Tecbnoloqy, 17 January 1994, p. 50; and, Clifford 
Beal, "Racing to Meet the Ballistic Missile Threat, • International 
Da(ense Reyiow, March 1993, p. 213. 
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Demonstration/Validation (OEM/VAL) program in 1996. 12 5 The 
UOES option would be a hedge, available in a national 
emergency, consisting of 40 prototype missiles, two TMD-
Ground Based Radars (GBR), and two Battle Management/Command, 
Control, Communications and Intelligence (BM/C3I) units.l26 
THAAD's future is unclear because its alleged 
capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles may 
interfere, or even halt, the 2 4 month OEM/VAL phase of 
development scheduled to begin in September, 1994. 
Does THAAD have the capability to intercept a 
strategic ballistic missile? Figure-2 illustrates THAAD's 
intercept capability against a strategic RV traveling at 7.2 
km/ sec. The diagram is an adoption of Herbert Lin' s modf;l of 
SAM performance against a strategic Ballistic Missile, except 
that target detection range is assumed, and, [one psi] keep-
out zones are plotted for nuclear blasts of one MT and 10 
MT.l27 THAAD is highly capable against a strategic ballistic 
missile in this very simplistic scenario. Additionally, the 
intercept point lies outside the 10 MT keep-out zone, thereby 
increasing THAAD's capability against the countermeasure of 
sa 1 vage fusing. Essentially, this analysis supports the 
125Interview beeween William Loomis, Vice-President for Defensive 
Missile Systems, Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Sunnyvale, CA., and the 
author, 29 April 1994. 
126Ibid. 
127For SAM performance, see Herbert Lin, New weapon Tecbnology, p. 
74-78; for nuclear keep-out zones see Samuel Glasstone, Tbe Effects of 
Nuclear Wgapons, 1962, p. 630. 
68 
premise that THAAD does have a significant military 
capability against strategic ballistic missiles. The 
advertised shoot-look-shoot doctrine could not be used in 
this scenario, because the range of the RV at intercept would 
not allow time for target damage assessment. 
300 
lnconing RV at 7.2 kmlsec 






T.iire after detection (sec) 
(Clnve A) 
interceptor 
Figure 2: TBAAD Interceptor versus Strategic RV 
Strategic RV detection range is assumed to be 300 k.m (two times the 
interceptor range). The THAAD interceptor is launched after a five 
second delay for trajectory computations; the interceptor is plotted at 
2.6 km/sec at a 30g acceleration. The RV is assumed to be a 10,000 km 
ballistic missile (from Table III) on a minimum energy trajectory with a 
reentry speed of 7.2 km/sec. No allowances are made for improvements in 
footprints due to radar or interceptor placement. 
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Both critics and proponents of TMD support the 
premise that THAAD has some capability against strategic 
ballistic missiles. Proponents will quickly add: "that the 
capability is only in a military sense and not a political 
one ... 12s In other words, just because THAAD is allegedly 
capable against a strategic ballistic missile, does not mean 
that there is a political intent to use the military 
capability. However, this is the capability versus intent 
argument that the United States frequently used against the 
former Soviet Union and, therefore, it is unlikely to 
prevail. The THAAD capability study recently published in 
Ar.ms Control Today concluded that "If an ATBM system is both 
robust against countermeasures and has a large footprint 
(with a radius of 100 kilometers or more) against 3,000 to 
3, 500 range TBMs, it will inevitably have a substantial 
capability against strategic targets.•l29 The study 
criticized the Clinton Administration's ABM Treaty proposal 
for establishing, only a 40 percent gap, between the reerttry 
speed of strategic warheads and the maximum speed that TMD 
systems can be tested against. The Administration proposed 
that the ABM Treaty should be "clarified," by defining TMD, 
as those systems with interceptors that have a demonstrated 
128rnterview between Baker Spring, The Heritage Foundation, 
Washington, D.C., and the Author, 17 May 1994. 
129Lisabeth Gronlund and others, •Highly Capable Theater Missile 
Defenses and the ABM Treaty,• ArmS Control T9day, April 1994, p. 8. 
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capability against reentry vehicles traveling at less than 
five km per second. 130 Strategic ballistic missiles typically 
have reentry speeds of seven to eight km per second--a gap of 
only 40 percent. 131 
Steve Hildreth illustrated the "40 percent gap is not 
enough" argument much more effectively in a recent 
Congressional Research Service report. He demonstrates that 
Patriot PAC-2 missiles were used against Iraqi-modified scuds 
whose peak velocities were 40 percent faster than the Patriot 
PAC-2 was designed for and tested against. 132 Hildreth 
concludes that assuming the Patriots were still 50 percent 
effective against the Scuds, then the logical analogy is: 
"that demonstrated missile defense capabilities do not 
degrade catastrophically, immediately beyond an upper test 
limit; instead these capabilities degrade gracefully."l33 
The issue, therefore, is no longer whether THAAD is 
capable of countering a strategic ballistic missile, but 
rather how will the demarcation line be established between 
TMD and ABM systems. More importantly, how will the issue of 
the TMD/ABM demarcation line affect the testing and 
130ounbar Lockwood, •senators Appear Skeptical of ABM Treaty 
Modifications,• Arms Control Today, April 1994, p. 17. 
131see Table III, in Chapter two, for the relationship of ballistic 
missile range to RV speed and reentry angle. 
132steven A. Hildreth, •The ABM Treaty and Theater Missile Defense: 
Proposed Changes and Potential Implications,• U.S. Library of Congress. 
Congress1onal Besearch Service, report 94-374F, 2 May 1994, p. 13. 
133Ibid. 
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development of u.s. systems already scheduled for deployment 
( i. e . , THAAD) . 
2. Navy Upper-Tier 
The Navy's is also developing a two-tiered approach 
to TMD. The Navy's upper-tier plan uses Aegis cruisers and 
destroyers as sea-based platforms to defend an area with a 
radius of a few hundred kilometers. 134 The Navy ' s primary 
candidate for an exoatmospheric interceptor is the Standard 
anti-air missile (SM2 ER Block IVA) combined with a 
Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile (LEAP) and a solid 
propellant kick stage. This combination would project a hit-
to-kill interceptor to exoatmoshperic altitudes at a speed of 
approximately 4.5 km per second--almost twice the speed of 
THAAD. 115 There are other options to deploy a so-called 
•marinized" version of THAAD in the existing vertical 
launchers on Aegis ships or develop a completely new 
interceptor.116 
134see Nick Cook, "France, USA Lead the Way with TMD Talks,• Jane's 
Defense Weekly, 19 March 1994, p. 1; Barbara Starr, "Navy T.MD Waits for 
Funding,• Jane's Defense Heekly, 12 March 1994, p. 20; and, David 
Hughes, •Aegis Ships to Fill Two-Tier Antimissile role,• Ayiation Week & 
Space Tecbnplogy, 7 June 1993, p. 127. 
135see Duncan Lennox, ed., Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Jane's 
Information Group, Surrey, UK, 1990; Joris J. Lok, "USN Prepares 'Make 
or Break' LEAP tests,• Jane's defense weekly, 23 April 1994, p. 13; 
and, Dunbar Lockwood, • U.S. Rejects Moscow's Proposal to Limit ATBM 
Interceptor Speeds,• Arms Control Tgd4y, May 1994, p. 19. 
136Interview between William loomis, Vice-President for Defensive 
Missile Systems, Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., Sunnyvale, CA, and the 
author, 29 April 1994. 
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The use of Aegis as an upper-tier TMD is already 
depicted as capable of providing an area defense of the 
United States in an emergency. Figure-3 illustrates the 
capability of the (SM-2 Block IV-A LEAP) against the same 
threat demonstrated in figure-2. 
180 
0 
Incoming RV at 7.2 km'sec 







Time after detection (sec) 
(Curve A) 
interceptor 
Figure 3: Upper-Tier Interceptors Versus Strategic RV 
Note: The assumed speed for the SM-2 Leap is 4. 5 km/ sec at a 3 Og 
acceleration. A five second delay before launch is used for trajectory 
computations after target detection. Curve-D is added to show [SM-2 
LEAP] and THAAD capability at a 200 km RV detection range. 
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Many analysts seem to believe the Navy's upper tier w·ill be 
able to defend a larger area than THAAD, but that analysis 
appears to be dependent on geography.l3 7 
The Navy's upper-tier system has a significant 
capability against a strategic ballistic missile based on 
current estimates of its operating parameters. Figure-3 
illustrates the that SM-2 LEAP interceptor is clearly more 
capable than THAAD when RV detection range is identical. 
Even at a constrained detection range of 200 km (Curve-D), 
both interceptors manage to keep the incoming RV outside the 
one MT keep-out zone. In the final analysis, the Navy Upper-
Tier and THAAD interceptors would be effective against all 
but the largest strategic ballistic RVs. 
The future of the Navy upper-tier program is not cast 
in stone; its very survival may be affected by funding 
constraints and the ABM capability issue. The funding issue 
recently surfaced in the BMDO's 1995-1999 budget request that 
earmarked only $157 million for sea-based upper-tier, instead 
of the approximately $600 needed to develop the program for 
eventual deployment. 13 B The end result of the funding change 
137David Mosher and others, •Theater Ballistic Missile Defenses: 
Selected Issues,• Congressional Budget Office-Staff Memorandum, July 
1993, p. 9-10. 
138Robert Holzer and Barbara Opal!, •u .S. Navy Fights BMDO for 
Antirnissile F~nds,• Defense News, 11 April 1994, p. 8. As if to •add 
insult to injury,• the authors report that the Air Force's BPI program 
was increased in funding to a level of nearly $500 million through 1999. 
See also Joseph Lovece, •Theater Missile Defense 'Core' Programs Will 
Cost $21 Billion,• ~, 14 February 1994, p. 1. 
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has reportedly downgraded the Navy's upper-tier to a 
demonstration effort instead of an acquisition program.~; 1 
The sea-based upper-tier's prospects for survivrtl are 
lessened by the recent funding limitations combined with its 
projected ABM capabilities. 
In summary, this evaluation demonstrates a 
significant capability for the Navy's upper tier TMD to 
counter strategic ballistic missiles Because the 
interceptor is projected to have a veloc~ty approximately 
double that of the THAAD missile, combined with the range and 
terminal seeker guidance of the LEAP kinetic kill vehicle, 
the capabilities of this system could constitute a "base" for 
a nationwide defense of territory. This conclusion is 
appropriate for two reasons: first, the Navy's use of 5294 
Vertical Launch Systems cells on 51 Aegis equipped ships 
could be perceived as a significant ABM capability that is 
sea-based, mobile, and supported py long-range sensor assets; 
and second, because this analysis illustrated THAAD's 
additional capability against a salvage-fused weapon, it 
simply recognizes that the Navy•s upper tier is significantly 
more capable against a strategic ballistic missile in a one-
on-one engagement. Politically, one could argue that the 
entire fleet of Aegis cruisers and destroyers would not be 
139sarbara Starr, •Navy Waits for TMD funding, • .Jan•'s D•f•nse 
weekly, 12 march 1994, p. 20. The Navy allegedly needs $180 to keep the 
program viable this year, but was allocated only $17 million. 
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equipped with the upper-tier interceptors, and therefore, 
could not be perceived as a threat to the ABM Treaty. But 
that argument assumes the Russians would have to agree. In 
the end, it appears that the sea-based upper-tier is probably 
the most likely candidate to be perceived as an ABM treaty 
violation. Deployment of this system would certainly require 
modification of the treaty. 
3. Patriot and Other Lower-tier Defenses 
The Patriot missile gained its political reputation 
during the Gulf war. The badly out-gunned Patriot was 
II tested in combat II against the relentless Scud missile 
attacks. Although there is much debate about the efficacy of 
the Patriot Anti-Tactical Capability-2 (PAC-2) 140 used in the 
Gulf war, additional improvements from Gulf War lessons 
learned to the PAC-2 upgrade will be deployed by 1995. 
Patriot's political fame is accredited for keeping Israel out 
of the gulf conflict and thereby maintaining the allied 
coalition. 
The Patriot system forms the lower tier component of 
the Army's High Altitude Theater Missile Defense (HATMDl 
requirement. 141 Patriot is a point defense system with an 
140For negative views of Patriot's effectiveness during the Gulf 
War, see John Conyers Jr. , • The Patriot Myth: Caveat Emptor, • ADD.~. 
Control Today, November 1992, p. 3; and, Joseph Lovece, •Electronic 
Noise from U.S. Gear Prompted errant patriots, • Defense Week, 28 
September 1992, p. 1. 
141w. Fredrick Kilgore, •Theater High Altitude Area Defense,• ~ 
ArmV THAAD Proiact Office Wbite Popar, Huntsville, AL, 4 February 1994, 
p. 1. 
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effective footprint radius in the "tens of kilometers" range. 
The Patriot PAC-3 program is an effort to make the Patriot 
even more responsive to the ballistic missile threat. 
Patriot radar improvements will allow greater range and 
altitude detection--in effect, increase the defensible 
footprint size over PAC-2. Additionally, the highly 
maneuverable and inertially guided ERINT interceptor, which 
employs hit-to-kill kinetic technology, was selected by the 
Army as the PAC-3 Missile. 142 With expanded detection 
capability over PAC-2, the PAC-3 footprint is sized as a 
radius of "several tens of kilometers" or mid-endoatmospheric 
range. Finally, one of the most important points about 
lower-tier defenses is that they maintain the capability for 
defense against aircraft and cruise missiles--in effect to 
protect the upper-tier defenses and other valuable areas to 
ensure the viability of the entire theater missile defense. 
Can lower-tier defenses form the basis for the 
development of a nationwide ABM defense of territory? Can 
the current TMO systems under development in the United 
States be perceived as having a capability to counter a 
strategic ballistic missile? If history is a precedent, then 
the Russians would have cat&se to adopt "an ABM capable" 
perception of America's lower-tier TMD development. The 
United states historically complained that some Soviet TMD 
142•Loral Gains Ballistic Missile Upper Hand,• Defense Electronics, 
May 1994, p. 10. 
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Systems had inherent ABM capabilities and that the Soviets 
tested them in an ABM mode.l43 For the simplicity of 
argument, the current United states lower tier systems are 
plotted in Figure-4 with strategic RV detection ranges of 
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Figure 4: Lower-Tier Interceptors Versus Strategic RV 
Notes: The assumed RV detection range is 100 km for a mid 
endoatmospheric TMD system. Curve (E) represents a Patriot or standard 
missile type interceptor with a velocity of 1.5 km/sec. Curve (F) more 
approximates a HAWK type interceptor with a velocity of one km/sec or 
less. Curves G, H, and K, represents incoming RVa at 100, 70, and 40 km 
respectively. 
143see Matthew Bunn, Fgundationa for the future, p. 82; and Brian 
Dailey and Patrick J. Parker, Soyiat Strategic pacaption, p. 249. These 
systems are also alleged to be leas capable than Patriot. 
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The conclusion that is immediately obvious, upon 
examination of Figure-4, is that the footprint size of the 
lower tier interceptor is very small and primarily dependent 
on RV detection range. For RV detection ranges of about 100 
km, the lower-tier footprint size is approximately 10-12 
kilometers. The relationship appears that an approximate 
doubling of detection range results in a doubling of 
footprint size for a ratio of RV to interceptor speed of at 
least four to one. 
Another conclusion drawn from figure-4 is that for 
ranges approximating 100 km or less, a salvaged-fused weapon 
of only 100 KT would render the defensive missile system 
useless for defense against strategic ballistic missiles. 
Interceptor speed does play a role in footprint size, but as 
Figure-4 illustrates, it is of a lesser magnitude than RV 
detection range. One of the common design criteria for all 
u.s. theater defenses appears to address this RV detection 
range criteria--external cueing and performance in concert 
with upper-tier defenses.l44 As detection range improves the 
lower-tier footprint size could be increased out to the 
maximum range of the interceptor. With future improvements 
in interceptor range and performance, the footprint size 
144For THAAD, Patriot, and Corps SAM, see W. Fredrick Kilgore, 
•Theater High Altitude Area Defense Program, • P. 2; for Aegis and 
Patriot external cueing, see Barbara Starr and John Boatman, •us Navy 
gets into Theater Missile Defense,• Internatignal Qefense Revigw, June 
1993, p. 468. 
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could be increased to the ranges approaching the 10 MT keep-
out zone for one psi avoidance. 
For the short-term, lower-tier missile defenses do 
not present a significant capability to counter strategic 
ballistic missiles in a population defense role. They could 
be used for clandestine defense of hardened targets. There 
is no question that the lower-tier footprint is extremely 
small by comparison to an upper-tier system, but as advances 
in technology produce highly accurate kinetic kill vehicles 
that are externally cued by long range sensors, even the 
boundary between lower- and upper-tier will become less 
clear. 
4 • Boost Phase Intercept 
The Air Force is studying several concepts for Boost 
Phase Intercept (BPI) , including lasers and kinetic kill 
vehicles to counter theater missiles in the boost phase of 
flight, normally less than one minute. The airborne laser 
platforms would be satellites, large aircraft, and unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) . 145 The kinetic kill approaches would 
consist of: ( 1) the Air force's Peregrine ;:oncept that 
employs an airborne platform C fighters and/or bombers) 
equipped with high speed interceptor missiles; 146 and, (2) the 
145•us Evaluates Candidates for Boost Phase Intercept,• 
Iptarnaticnal Qefansa Reyiaw, November 1993, p. 850. 
146oavid Hughes, •BMDO Under Pressure to SET TMD Priorities, • 
Ayiation W.ak & Spas• T9sbn0 logy, 17 January 1994, p. 49. 
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Responsive Aircraft Program for Theater Operations (RAPTOR), 
would employ formations of UAVs carrying sensors and TALON 
(Theater Applications-Launch on Notice) hypervelocity 
missiles--3.3 km per second--to engage TBMs at ranges of up 
to 220 km. 
The BMDO recently increased the funding profile for 
BPI in its 1995-1999 budget request, and concomitantly 
reduced the profile for the Navy's upper-tier and the Corps 
SAM lower-tier systems. The BPI concept, if technically 
viable, would represent a serious threat to strategic 
ballistic missiles as well. If a TBMD system has the 
capability to counter a tactical ballistic missile in the 
first few seconds of launch, then it obviously has the 
ability to also counter a strategic ballistic missile in the 
boost phase. 
If the United States surveys its policy options for 
deployment of BPI systems, agreements and limitations for 
their use must be established prior to development. This 
would reduce the serious possibility of wasteful expenditure 
of funds on systems that can not be deployed. BPI systems 
have a significant capability to 
ballistic missile and to provide a 
territory. 
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counter a strategic 
"base" for defense of 
B. SUIOIARY: TMD, TECHNOLOGY AND TORPBDO STAND-OFF 
RANGB 
This chapter supported the premise that some TMD systems 
in development or planned by the u.s. might be capable of 
countering strategic ballistic missiles. The analysis 
demonstrated that area defense systems, such as the Army's 
THAAD and the Navy's Upper-Tier are capable of countering a 
strategic ballistic missile in a one on one engagement. 
Computer studies were cited that demonstrated THAAD's 
defensible footprint against a strategic target (with a radar 
cross section of 0. 05 square meters) is approximately 60 
kilometers. THAAD does represent a violation of the ABM 
Treaty because it is capable against a strategic ballistic 
missile based on the study completed by the Arms Control 
Association. 
In order to make the analysis of TMD capability against a 
strategic ballistic missile more indicative of actual 
capability, this chapter used a model that went beyond mere 
footprint analysis. The model is based on the assumption 
that a combination of defended TMD footprint area and nuclear 
blast effects would be more representative of the interaction 
of a TMD interceptor with a strategic ballistic missile. The 
model confirmed that THAAD and the Navy Upper-Tier are 
capable of intercepting, and avoiding the nuclear blast 
effects of salvaged-fused strategic ballistic missile 
warhead. 
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Lower-Tier TMD systems (i.e., Patriot, HAWK, etc.) are 
not capable against a strategic ballistic missile; moreover, 
these systems can not avoid the nuclear blast effects. Boost 
phase systems are inherently capable against a strategic 
ballistic missile if they can counter a theater ballistic 
missile; they are an obvious violation of the ABM Treaty. 
The argument often used by proponents of TMD is that 
admittedly THAAD and the Navy Upper-Tier would have some 
capability against a strategic ballistic missile in a very 
controlled situation, but only in a military sense without 
political intent. This chapter has shown and I contend 
that the ABM Treaty is apolitical; any military 
capability is assumed to be an ABM capability. The 
treaty must be changed in order to address the technological 
progress made in missile defense. 
The technological prowess of ballistic missile defense in 
the 1990s is superior to that of the 1960s and 1970s. Some 
of the technological advances of the 1980's "Star Wars" era 
are now incorporated in today' s theater defense systems. 
Advances such as kinetic kill vehicles, that employ onboard 
infrared seekers and LEAP technology are all offshoots of the 
"Star Wars" research. THAAD and ERINT are both hit-to-kill 
interceptors that employ these technologies. The Navy's 
upper-tier is slated to make use of the LEAP technology for 
greatly increased range. Some estimates put the range of the 
LEAP kill vehicle, alone, in the range of hundreds of 
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kilometers. 147 General Horner recognized the revolution in 
technology and external cueing when he recently said: 
What happened is that in Operation ~oesert Storm" 
everyone became aware of the revolution in warfare .... the 
use of space-based assets played a major role in making 
that happen. The key goal of the Space Command is to 
develop ways to get satellite cueing, targeting, and 
communications information directly into the cockpits and 
ships. 148 
The use of space or air-based assets is assumed in future 
u.s. conflicts. 
The revolution in torpedo technology presents an 
historical analogy to the revolution in ballistic missile 
defense. During World war II, submarine commanders had to 
approach targets to within a 1000 to 1500 yards to ensure a 
hit. The straight running torpedoes of that period were 
essentially, little more that point and shoot weapons. The 
short range was necessary to reduce target solution errors to 
the point necessary for a hit. Following World War II the 
Superpowers introduced two innovations: the nuclear tipped 
and acoustic torpedoes. Nuclear torpedoes would solve the 
solution accuracy problem--just point and shoot at long 
range. Acoustic torpedoes and better ship mounted sonar 
drastically improved target detection range and, 
147Jane's Strategic Weapon Syatem, 1990, Surrey, UK., s.v. •Missile 
Defenses.• 
148rnterview between General Charles Horner, u.s. Space Command and 
Barbara Starr in Jane's Defence W&ekly, 19 March 1994, p. 32. 
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consequently, increased submarine standoff range by 
approximately a power of magnitude over World War II values. 
Today Is ballistic missile defense evolved through much 
the same process from the old days of the Nike Hercules--
nuclear tip point and shoot missiles--to today Is technology 
of missile mounted sensors, kinetic kill vehicles, and 
external cueing. In effect, the solution accuracy problem no 
longer diminishes the standoff range to the point of creating 
an unacceptable danger to the defender. Of course, these 
systems are still vulnerable to countermeasure, but it 
appears that solving the problem of hitting the incoming 
missile is, as much a part of history, as the straight 
running torpedo. 
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IV. ARMS CONTROL STRUCTURE 
The arms control structure is a phrase often used to 
refer to the current and past results of the efforts between 
the United States and the former Soviet Union to negotiate 
strategic arms control agreements. The structure is 
perceived to be represented by the various arms control 
agreements, such as the Strategic Arms limitation Talks 
(SALT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), that 
supposedly enhance the quest for strategic stability. 
Are views of the arms ·ontrol structure and the quest for 
strategic stability perceived differently by the United 
States and the former Soviet Union? Scholars and officials 
associated with the arms control process cite different 
motives of the superpowers for involvement in the arms 
control process: first, for the United States, arms control 
is a technical exercise in managing and reducing the threat 
posed by aggressive or destabilizing "capabilities •; and, 
second the former Soviet Union views arms control as an 
exercise in managing political threats, reducing aggressive 
or destabilizing "intentions," and obtaining strategic 
advantage. 149 Whether "intentions• or •capabilities• 
149see Kerry M. Kartchner, Negotiating Start, New Brunswick, 
Transaction Publishers, 1992, p. 2; and Brian 0. Dailey and Patrick J. 
Parker, Soyiet Strategic Degaption, p. 226-227. 
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permeated the motives for strategic stability between the 
United States, and now, Russia, the arms control structure is 
perceived today as the best method to reach strategic 
stability. 
This section will examine the ABM treaty as it relates to 
the arms control structure. Since the ABM Treaty is 
perceived as the sine qao non of strategic offensive 
deterrence, its demise may adversely affect the arms control 
structure and accelerate a global shift in strategic 
deterrence form offensive to defensive. 
A. THE ABM TREATY AND THE ARMS CONTROL STRUCTURE 
The ABM Treaty appears to be the foundation upon which 
arms control is constructed. Matthew Bunn called it "the 
centerpiece of strategic arms control and a bulwark of u.s. 
national-security. "150 The 24 year old accord was signed by 
the United States and the Soviet Union in May, 1972. The 
United States and the Soviet Union also signed the Interim 
Agreement on strategic offensive arms at the same time. The 
so-called SALT I accords thus contained two parts: ( 1) 
offensive--Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons, and (2) 
lSOThe title of Bunn's book describes his reverence for the ABM 
Treaty. See Matthew Bunn, Foyndation for the Fytyre; Tbe A8M Treaty and 
Mational Secyrity, p. 4. 
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defensive--the ABM Treaty. 15 1 Figure-S illustrates the ABM 
Treaty and how it forms the basis for and supports the arms 
control structure. 





Figure 5. 'l'he ABM Treaty &: the Arms control Structure 
The negotiation of limitations on defensiv~ and offensive 
arms was closely linked. Under the Interim Agreement, both 
151Teena K. Mayers, Understanding weapons and Arms Control; A guide 
to the issues, Washington, D.c., Maxwell Macmillan-Pergamom Publishing 
Corp., 1991, 4th ed. Rev., p. 109-110. 
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sides were permitted to expand their sea-based missile forces 
only if they dismantled an equal number of older land or sea-
based missile launchers. 15 2 Both countries agreed to follow 
up the Interim Agreement with active negotiations for more 
comprehensive limitations in the arms race. Thus the Interim 
Agreement was a holding action to compliment the ABM Treaty, 
to limit competition in offensive weapons, and to provide a 
framework for further negotiations.l53 
The ABM Treaty provided the physical constraints on 
ballistic missile defense systems so that limits on current 
offensive arms could be obtained. Moreover, the Interim 
Agreement allowed for on-going negotiations for future 
offensive arms reduction. Thus, the ABM Treaty formed the 
basis of the arms control measure adopted concurrently and 
labeled as the Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons or SALT 
I. The follow-on arms control Agreements such as SALT II, 
the INF Treaty, START I and II have actually led to bilateral 
arrangements, not just for 0ffensive arms limitations, but 
offensive arms reduction. The ABM Treaty thus forms the 
basis for follow-on arms control agreements that constitute 




describes the success of START as "the latest triumph of the 
ABM Treaty. "15 4 
B. EFFECTS OF A WEAKENED ABM TREATY 
A weakened or ignored ABM Treaty would not be conducive 
to the maintenance of the arms control structure. Since the 
ABM Treaty forms the foundation for the restraint of 
strategic defensive missile systems between the United States 
and states of the former Soviet Union, the continued 
reductions in strategic offensive missiles would be in 
jeopardy. There is a genuine danger that START will not be 
implemented, and a virtual certainty that the opportunity to 
reduce even further the number of offensive nuclear weapons 
will be foreclosed.l55 Other United States arms control 
objectives would also be in jeopardy: (1) a continued 
moratorium on nuclear testing and negotiation of a 
Comprehensive Test Ban; and, (2) continued opposition to 
further nuclear proliferation. 156 Finally other nuclear 
powers such as France, United Kingdom, Israel, may perceive 
their strategic offensive missiles as inadequate and generate 
further regional arms races. The regional arms race 
phenomenon is particularly relevant, dangerous, and complex 
154Paul C. Warnke, •success Linked to ABM Treaty,• The Bulletin of 
the Atgmic Scientists, November 1991, p. 18. 
155rbid. 
156steve A. Hildreth, "The ABM Treaty and Theater Missile Defense: 
Proposed Changes and Potential Implications,• P. 21. 
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between Israel and her Arab neighbors.~ 5 .., One possible 
secondary effect of regional arms races may be the 
proliferation of missile defensive systems to offset the 
increase in offensive missiles.l58 
Non-adherence to the ABM treaty by the United states and 
Russia may not result in an immediate offensive arms race 
between the two countries. Russia's depressed economy is not 
in a position to support an offensive arms race for the short 
term. In the long run, the so-called Russian nationalist 
sentiment could again raise fears of an offensive arms 
competition. 159 The immediate effect of non-adherence to the 
ABM Treaty is that proliferation of defensive missile systems 
could block the unprecedented opportunity to reduce strategic 
forces. 160 It appears that the "ABM as a symbol of the arms 
race" described by Robert S. McNamara, in 1965, equally 
157see Robert E. Looney, "Arms Races in the Middle East: A Test of 
Causality,• Arms Control, September 1990, p. 178. Dr. looney's main 
finding in this study was that suppressing increases in Israeli defense 
expenditures is the most effective way of reducing militarization in the 
region. 
158Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and APti-Nar, Little, Brown 
and Company, Boston, Mass., 1993, p. 102. 
159steven Erlanger, •u .S. Agrees to Postpone Joint Exercises in 
Russia,• Tbe New York Times, 1 June 1994, A4. See also McGeorge Bundy, 
William J. Crowe, and Sidney D. Drell, Reducing Nuclear panger; Tbe Road 
AwaY from the Brink, New York, Council on Foreign Affairs, 1993, p. 41. 
160Gerard C. Smith, "Two Decades Later: The ABM Treaty in a Changed 
World," Arms Control T9day, May 1992, p. 3. 
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influences offensive arms reduction in the same negative 
manner as an arms build-up. :.;l 
The above view of the effects of the ABM Treaty assumes 
the action-reaction phenomenon in arms acquisition among 
competitive nations. The negative perspective of the ABM and 
the SALT process denies that the ABM Treaty had any effect on 
the offensive arms acquisition during the 1970s and 1980s. 
The following quote by Brennan is illustrative of ABM Treaty 
opponents: 
The one thing that is most certain about this Soviet 
buildup is that, if we had gone ahead with the 
'Safeguard' BMD System to protect Minuteman as proposed 
in 1969, every one of the critics of BMD would today be 
blaming that Soviet buildup on our Safeguard deployment. 
I am therefore cempted to claim that the most 
constructive result of the 1972 ABM treaty is that it 
unambiguously demolished this explanation for the Soviet 
buildup, the rate of which increased in the aftermath of 
SALT I . 162 
The main point of the opposing view is that the history of 
arms buildup following SALT I demonstrates that the Soviets 
have often marched to their own drum. The United States 
mistakenly believed it understood Soviet intentions and 
objectives during SALT I, and therefore, erroneously 
attributed arms reduction to the ABM Treaty. 
161Morton H. Halperin, "The 
Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics 
Foreign Affairs, October 1972, p. 73. 
Decision to Deploy the ABM: 
in the Johnson Administration, • 
162eonald G. Brennan, "BMD Policy Issues for the 1990s,• in William 
Schneider, Jr. and others, •u.s. strategic-Nuclear Policy and Ballistic 
Missile pefense; Tbe 1980s and Beyond, a special report, Institute for 
Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, Mass., 1980, p. 30. See also Gerard 
Smith, pouble Talk, p. 472. 
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Finally, if highly effective ABM systems were deployed, 
the whole concept of strategic nuclear deterrence would be 
eroded. The shift to a defensive and damage limiting posture 
is very appealing, because it extols the virtue of human 
lives saved instead of mere acquiescence to nuclear weapons 
destruction. President Reagan • s call to "render nuclear 
missiles impotent and obsolete" exemplifies the attra~tion of 
ballistic missile defenses. lo3 Real world situations would 
probably result in a mix of strategic offensive missiles and 
ABM defenses, but the effect on strategic stability is 
uncertain. 164 Perhaps the greatest danger in a transition 
from offensive deterrence to a combination of offense-defense 
strategy would be the uncertain effect on strategic 
stability. 
The current arms control structure produces an element of 
predictability, and the reluctance to give up that 
predictability in exchange for the uncertainty that the 
absence of the treaty would bring has no doubt helped to keep 
it in force. 165 
163see the series on •weapons in Space,• The New York Times, 3-8 
March 1985. 
164rnterview between Baker Spring, The Heritage Foundation, and the 
Author, 29 April 94. 
165George Schneiter, "The ABM Treaty Today,• in Aston B. Carter and 
David N. Schwartz, eds., Ballistic Missile Defense, p. 243. 
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V. PROSPECTS FOR 'l'BB FO'l'ORB 
The future of TMD as envisioned by the Department of 
Defense is problematic at best. Obstacles that have to be 
overcome include: ( 1} TMD ambiguities contained in the ABM 
Treaty; ( 2} amendments or clarification proposed to change 
the treaty; ( 3) funding restraints; ( 4) multilateralization 
and, (5) traditional opponents of ballistic missile defense. 
The ABM Treaty is argumentatively one of the most 
respected and despised documents ever written. Arms control 
proponents believe it served to halt the strategic arms race 
between the superpowers and is ever deserving of reverence. 166 
critics view the treaty as an outdated document that 
restricts the development of defenses needed to counter 
ballistic missile proliferation.l67 One area of agreement 
among critics and proponents is the need for changes to the 
ABM Treaty. It is those needed changes that add to imprecise 
phrases and undefined terms and create ambiguity in the 
treaty. The lack of clarity in this extraordinary brief 
166see Gerard C. Smith, •Two Decades Later: The ABM Treaty in a 
changed World, • Arms Control Today, May 1992, p. 3; Matthew Bunn, 
Found4tion for the future, p. 4. 
167see Theresa Hitchens, •Treaty Rewrite Would Bolster Tactical 
Defenses,• Defense NeWS, 20 December 1993, p. 4; Interview between Baker 
Spring, The Heritage Foundation, and the author, 29 April 1994; and, 
Interview between William loomis, Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., and the 
author, 29 April 1994. 
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document will not aid the restraint and control of TMD 
systems. Additionally, the efficacy of the ABM Treaty will 
remain in question until the inherent ambiguities are 
resolved. 
The ABM Treaty has not been changed or clarified for 12 
years.:~s The Clinton administration made a proposal through 
the SCC c....nd the Russians to clarify the Treaty. This 
proposal created much controversy among the arms control 
community and the Russians because it was perceived as too 
liberal in TMD restrictions. The arms control community 
assert that the proposed TMD demarcation line established at 
a system capability to intercept an incoming theater missile 
target traveling five km/sec or less exceeds the requirements 
for theater defensive capability; moreover, a limit of five 
km/sec for TMD designation will allow significant capability 
against a strategic ballistic missile as well. 16 9 The 
Russians reportedly acknowledged that both sides need to 
develop TMD systems to defend against missiles with ranges up 
to 3500 km, but argued that the single criteria of velocity 
was insufficient. 110 The United States rejected a Russian 
168sidney N. Graybeal, Testimony Before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Cgmmittee on Effective Theater Missile pefenses and the ABM 
Treaty, 3 may 1994. 
169ounbar Lockwood, •u.s. Proposal to Retool ABM Treaty Reopens 




counter-proposal of concomitantly restricting interceptor 
missile speed to three km/sec. The prospects for the needed 
changes to the ABM Treaty remain bleak for the short-term. A 
scheduled meeting of the sec in June has been postponed 
indefinitely. 171 
TMD funding restraints are significant when overall 
program cost are considered. A recent study conducted by the 
Congressional Budget Office revealed that the BMDO could 
adequately fund only .tliQ. of the three core TMD programs 
slated for development through 1999.17 2 The THAAD and Patriot 
were fully funded, under the study assumptions, but the Navy 
lower-tier was not. Another complicating factor was that 
BMDO's FY1995-1999 funding level was reduced from $18 to $17 
billion by the Department of Defense (DOD). All sectors of 
the Department of Defense are affected by the declining 
budget in the post Cold War era. The future does not hold 
promise for increased program funding levels, but the funding 
profile for most TMD programs appears to be up. Table v 
illustrates estimated life-cycle costs for various TMD 
programs. Costs estimates are usually understated in the 
research and development phases of DOD programs. That 
premise is supported by the range of the figures in Table v 
17lrnterview between Major Ward, Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization, Office of Deputy for Strategic Relations, Washington, 
D.C., and the author, 23 May 1994. 
172David Mosher and others, •Theater Ballistic Missile Defenses: 
Selected Issues,• Congressional Budget Office CBO Staff Memorandum, July 
1993, p. 16. 
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which are higher than previous estimates. 1 7 1 The higher 
estimates usually are not from DOD officials. 
'l'ABLE V: 'l'MD LIFE CYCLE COS'l'S (THEN YR. DOLLARS) 
System ~ 
THAAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $12 -14 . 9 
Patriot PAC-2 ............... $2 
Patriot PAC-3 ............. $3.2 
Navy LT ................... $2-4 
Navy U'I' ••••••••••••••••••• $ 4- 5 
Corps SAM ................ $8-15 








Source: Statement of Brad Hathaway, General ;ccounting Office, Before 
the Committee on Foreign Relations U.S. Senate, 3 May 1994, GAO/T 
-NSIAD-94-167, P. 4-5; Joseph Lovece, "Theater Missile Defense 'Core' 
Programs will Cost $21 Billion,• Defense Week, 14 February 1994, p. 1; 
and "Missile Defense Centerpiece weapon to Cost $17 Billion, • Defense 
~~ 22 February 1994, p. 1. 
The Navy is contesting a significant BMDO funding reduction 
in the Aegis upper-tier system. This comes at a particularly 
bad time because the Navy faces a budget shortfall of roughly 
$3.5 billion per year in FY95-99.174 
The ABM Treaty is a bilateral instrument between the 
United states and the former Soviet Union. Many of the 
states of the former Soviet Union, in addition to Russia, 
have committed themselves to fulfill the provisions of the 
ABM Treaty and to include all the necessary agreements with 
173Joseph Lovece, "Missile Defense Centerpiece Weapon To Cost $17 
Billion,• pefense Week, 22 February 1994, p. 1. 
174John Boatman, Interview with Rear Admiral Philip Quast, Director 
US Navy Surface Warfare Division, Jane's pefense Weekly, 12 February 
1994, p. 32. 
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the United States. 175 This would make changes to the treaty 
much more difficult than they already are. Moreover, the 
United States said it was prepared to multilateralize the 
treaty. 176 Other problems associated with multilateralization 
include Soviet ABM radars located in Latvia and Azerbaijan 
that raise ABM compliance issues. In summary, 
multilateralization appears to be an unnecessary and 
unworkable complication to the ABM Treaty.l77 
The opponents and supporters of BMD still exist along the 
same lines as in the Reagan "Star wars" era. It appears that 
the effort to reduce funding for missile defenses, whether 
theater or national variety, will continue for the 
foreseeable future. 
The basic position taken by those who support ballistic 
missile ·.:.tefense is that: ( 1) we need TMD to protect our 
allies and troops deployed overseas in future theater 
conflicts where ballistic missiles may be used; (2) we need a 
limited national ballistic missile defense to protect the 
continental United States from accidental missile launch by 
Russia or a future outlaw state that is projected to obtain 
ICBM capability; (3) we need TMD to discourage global 
17 SJack Mendelsohn, • A New Threat to the ABM Treaty: The 
Administration's TMD Proposal,• Arms Control T9day. January/February 
1994, p. 12. 
176Ibid. 
177Interview between Baker Spring and the author, 29 April 1994. 
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ballistic missile proliferation; (4) the restructured 
ballistic missile defense program is renamed, ground-based 
vice space-based, conforms to the 1972 ABM Treacy, realistic, 
and more properly meets the threat of global ballistic 
missile proliferation.: 78 
The position taken by those who oppose BMD is that: \1) 
the nation has spent too much money on BMD with nothing to 
show for it--some $30 billion to date; (2) Theater defenses 
are a waste of time and effort; even a fool-proof system will 
not defend against cruise missile::.. ( 3) a national missile 
defense system will not defend against weapons of mass-
destruction delivered by personnel or vehicles other than 
missiles such as boats, helos, car, train, etc.; (4) the 
development of BMD is technologically unsound as evidenced by 
alleged falsification of SDI missile experiments, in 1984, to 
make the program appear more successful than it really was; 179 
(5) the new Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) is 
just "Star Wars" renamed to include the Patriot upgrade for 
TMD; there is considerable doubt about the performance of 
Patriot during the gulf war, so maybe some technical problems 
remain in solving the ballistic missile threat; ( 6) the 
ballistic missile defense program has too many TMD programs 
and we can't afford them all; we are spending more on BMD 
178ca&1ressional Recgrd, 8-9 September 1993, 11092-11100. 
17 STim Weiner, Aspin Says Inquiry Is Set On 1984 •star Wars• Test, 
New Xgrk Times, 19 August, 1993, A1. 
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than any other weapons program; deficit reduction will 
eventually reduce the funding profile; (7) spending funds on 
the National Ballistic Missile Defense program is not 
necessary, because the threat is not near-term; (8) the u.s. 
deployed an ABM system in the mid 1970s and closed it 30 days 
later--why repeat the process. Obviously, the ABM debate 
will continue, but Congress appears willing, for the short 
term, to allow the Clinton administration to take a position 
before changing the funding profile drastically. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
At the outset of this analysis I proposed that current 
plans for TMD development and deployment posed serious u.s. 
policy questions: first, how ambiguous is the ABM Treaty in 
relation to TMD systems? Second, do current u.s. TMD 
programs possess capabilities to counter strategic ballistic 
missiles? Third, will the lack of a demarcation line between 
TMD and ABM systems in the treaty prohibit TMD systems from 
acquiring a capability against a strategic ballistic missile? 
Fourth, what are the implications for the global arms control 
structure for an abrogated ABM Treaty? Fifth, are 
technological advances in TMD sensors, missile interceptors, 
radar, and external cueing available to TMD systems out 
pacing the ABM Treaty? 
The ABM Treaty is unclear in relation to TMD development 
and deployment. Some of the ambiguities in the treaty text 
were supposedly clarified at the treaty signature process by 
three attachments labeled as Agreed Statements, common 
Understandings, and Unilateral Statements. Since the 
majority of the attachments to the treaty were written 
against the first six articles of the treaty, an improved 
clarity of understanding between the two parties to the 
treaty would be a logical assumption. This thesis 
demonstrates that the Treaty remains ambiguous in the same 
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general area that was supposedly clarified 22 years ago. 
Although the brevity of the ABM Treaty text (approximately 
four pages) does not indicate ambiguity, the text length of 
the three attachments to the treaty exceeds the Treaty 
text. By comparison, the START I Treaty is two orders of 
magnitude longer than the ABM Treaty at approximately 250 
pages of text. The ABM Treaty has not been changed or 
updated in 12 years and it remains ambiguous in relation to 
TMD development. 
Some TMD systems planned by the United States are capable 
of countering a strategic ballistic missile. There are many 
assumptions associated with measuring the capability of a TMD 
system to counter a strategic ballistic missile. The 
analysis used herein assumed that the combination of the 
defended TMD footprint area and nuclear blast effects would 
be more representative of the interaction of a TMD system 
with a strategic ballistic missile. The Army's THAAD system 
and the Navy's upper-tier are capable of intercepting, and 
avoiding the nuclear blast effects of a salvaged-fused 
strategic ballistic missile warhead. These two systems will 
probably represent a violation of the ABM Treaty as it is 
currently written. The defended footprint of lower-tier 
systems is satisfactory against a conventionally armed 
ballistic missile, but would not avoid the nuclear blast 
effect of a salvaged-fused strategic ballistic missile. If 
Boost Phase Intercept systems are capable of intercepting 
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theater ballistic missiles in the first few minutes of 
flight, then they are also capable of intercepting strateg~c 
ballistic missiles. Boost Phase systems represent the 
clearest violation of the ABM Treaty. 
The lack of a clear distinction between TMD and ABM 
systems in the ~reaty does not prohibit American TMD systems 
from acquiring a capability against strategic ballistic 
missiles. Because TMD systems are not defined in the treaty, 
their development is dependent on the functional 
definition of not "being given the capability to counter a 
strategic ballistic missile." The Clinton administration's 
recent sec proposal to clarify the treaty, if accepted, would 
provide a demarcation between strategic and theater defensive 
missile systems. The proposal appears to cloud the issue 
further by recommending that a theater defense system can be 
labeled as a TMD system, as long as it is not tested against 
a target traveling greater than five km/sec. A TMD system 
that is capable against a five km/sec target also has some 
capability against a strategic target traveling at six to 
seven km/sec. The future of the THAAD flight test program is 
in question because of uncertainties in the maximum target 
speed permitted by the ABM Treaty. Additionally, the Clinton 
proposal raises the "capability versus intent" argument that 
was often rebuked by the u.s. when used by the Soviets. 
The ABM Treaty is viewed by the United States and Russia 
as the foundation for the arms control structure. If the ABM 
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Treaty is perceived as ineffective in controlling the ABM 
capabilities of TMD systems, the prospects for scheduled arms 
redtctions between the two nuclear Superpowers are not good. 
The arms control implications for other nuclear powers are 
equally uncertain. If Israel installs a TMD that is capable 
of protecting the entire country from ballistic missile 
attack, the Arab calculation of their offensive ability may 
generate arms race incentives. The reverse is true if the 
Arabs decide to install TMD area defense systems that are ABM 
capable against Israel's offensive missiles. Similar 
regional escalation in arms production can be envisioned for 
other nuclear powers such as France, India, China, or 
Britain. Continuation of the Nuclear Test Ban would be 
problematic under these circumstances. 
Advancements in missile defense technology stretch the 
ABM Treaty's functional definition of "capability to counter 
a strategic ballistic missile." Improvements in ballistic 
missile defense capability are strikingly comparable to 
improvements made in submarine torpedo stand-off range since 
world War II. Today' s TMD uses Hit-To-Kill technology, 
missile mounted infrared seekers, highly maneuverable missile 
interceptors, and available external cueing. These 
technological advancements make the capability argument 
obsolete. It is no longer a question of capability to 
counter a strategic ballistic missile, but how should new 
technological functions of bal.iistic missile defense be 
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addressed in the ABM Treaty. 
of "capability" in the 
improvements in technology, 
Since the functional definition 
treaty is being expanded by 
if the treaty is not modified, 
"capability" will no longer be an adequate measure of an ABM 
function. 
Funding restraints represent a major obstacle to TMD 
development beyond THAAD, Patriot, and the Navy lower-tier. 
Unless radical changes are made in the BMDO budget profile, 
even the core programs may not be fully funded. The 
prospects for the technology demonstration programs such as 
Navy upper-tier, Corps SAM, and Boost Phase systems are not 
promising at an aggregate life cycle cost estimate of $12 to 
$20 billion (excludes Boost systems). 
Although the ABM Treaty is ambiguous in the area of TMD, 
efforts to clarify the distinction between ABM and TMD in the 
treaty probably will not be successful. The proposed 
clarification presents only a single standard for TMD 
determination, and even that is criticized as permitting TMD 
performance that is capable against a strategic ballistic 
missile. In short, the ABM Treaty is not likely to be 
changed to address the problems, but radical TMD development 
and deployment will be controlled more by budgetary restraint 
instead of treaty restrictions. 
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